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Schumpeter once expressed the opinion that the economic history of the
United States in the second half of the nineteenth century could be written
solely in terms of the railroad sector.Clearly an exaggeration, the
observation still has the merit of focusing upon one of the dynamic forces
in American economic development. Yet our measure of that force is
severely restricted. Our only continuous railway series is mileage operated,
and such relevant magnitudes as ton and passenger mileage, employment,
and capital stock are not available, even in imperfect form, until the 1880's,
well after the phase of most rapid growth.
The first and principal part of this paper seeks to repair these omissions
by setting out a continuous quantitative record of development for the
railroad sector from its beginnings in the 1830's to its peak just before
the First World War. The detailed statistics compiled by the Interstate
Commerce Commission carry the record forward more than adequately
from that time on.
Four series are constructed: output, employment, capital stock, and
fuel consumption. Despite their obvious diversity, as well as the differences
in the quality of the underlying information, there is a unity in the approach
that should be noted.In the great majority of instances, the estimates
have been reached by two alternative routes. The first is by direct manipu-
lation of physical units—ton- and passenger-miles, tons of coal, track
mileage, and so forth—whereas the second starts from the financial
accounts reflecting these magnitudes—traffic receipts, fuel expenditures,
book value of road and equipment—but has the same goal. The obvious
NOTE:I gratefully acknowledge the painstaking care with which the original draft
of this paper was read by Richard A. Easterlin. His comments and suggestions have
contributed much to the final form the paper has taken, although he must be absolved
of any responsibility for the shortcomings that remain.584 SOURCES OF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
virtue of this duality is an internal check upon the final estimates. How-
ever, there are further gains as well.It is the inconsistency between
movements in the trackage and equipment index and Ulmer's investment
series that calls attention to the inadequacies in our existing dollar measures
of investment. This is an instance where the check is not internal, but
relates to other previous estimates. A second advantage of the physical
approach to the capital stock—spelled out in greater detail below—is its
avoidance of some particularly nasty deflation problems.Cumulative
railroad investment can be interpreted unequivocally as the reproduction
cost of the current-year stock with base-year prices and technology, but
current-year quality. Ordinary price indexes, built up of quotations on
an ever-changing unit, when applied to current expenditures, do not
produce the same straightforward result.
The second part of the paper goes on from these estimates, to consider
the record of productivity change implied by them. ,Itboth corrects
Kendrick's post-1869 measures of productivity in the railroad sector, and
extends those measures considerably backward in time.Then, in an
effort to explain the observed pattern of increasing productivity, we take
up the contribution of certain key innovations of the latter nineteenth
century: steel rails, automatic couplers, power brakes, improved rolling
stock. Of more general interest in this section is the use of a simple
technique for integrating the up-to-now distinct approaches from the side
of sectoral productivity measures, and from the side of specific techno-
logical developments.
Quantitative Measures of Railroad Development,
1840—1910: Output
Table 1 sets out estimates of passenger- and ton-miles, and the rates that
make possible their combination into a single output index. This index
is of the link-relative form, one familiar to users and producers of statistics
covering relatively long spans of years.' The virtue of the method is the
comparability it affords between adjacent observations when structural
change is quite rapid—in this instance, the relative importance of freight
and passenger service, and their rates.Laspeyres or Paasche indexes
freeze the price structure or the output mix at that of a given year, with
the consequence that they are very sensitive to the choice of the base.2
1See,for example, John W. Kendrick, Productivity Trends in the United States,
Princeton for NBER, 1961, p. 55, for a discussion of the link-relative approach and its
use in that study.
2Althoughthe Paasche index is currently weighted in the sense that prices of the
current year are used to evaluate output of the current and the base year, there are
different results when alternative bases, i.e., output mixes, are used.TA8LE 1
PHYSICAL OUTPUT ESTIMATES, 1839—1910
















1839 0.09 0,03 5.0 7.5 0.04
1849 0.47 0.35 2.9 4.05 0.31
1859 1.9 2.6 2.44 2.58 1.74
1870 4.1 11.7 2.8 2.18 6.03
1880 5.7 32.3 2.51 1.29 13.78
1890 12.1 80.0 2.20 .92 32.79
1900 16.2 144.0 2.00 .73 54.79
1910 32.5 255.0 1.94 .75 100.00
Source
CoZ.a. 2—4
1839—59: Albert Fishlow, AmericanRaiLroadsandtheTransformation of
theAnteBeUwn Economy (in press), Cambridge, Mass., Appendix A.
1870:Interpolated on sample series between 1859 and 1880; see text.
1880:U.S. Bureau of the Census, Tenth Census, 1880, Vol. IV, Agencies of
Transportation, p. 11.
1890:U.S. Bureau of the Census, Eleventh Census, 1890, Vol. XI, Agencies
of Transportation, p. 593.
1900, 1910:Harold Barger, Output in the Transportation Indu8t2 i-ca,
Princeton for NBER, 1951, Appendix B.
Col, 5:The formula for the link—relative index is:
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fthe rates of col.4.
apiecalyear for 1880—1910 ends June 30.For previous years the typical
practice of individual roads was to report either on September 30 or at
year's end, which would make the covered year correspond to a fiscal year
ending in the autumn (cf. Edwin Frickey, Production in the United States,
186'0—1914, Cambridge, Mass.,1947, p. 115).
bcoveragewas extended by means of tlieratiosof mileage of roads report-
ing tonnage and passengers to mileage of roads reporting ton—miles and
passenger—miles.It was assumed that the average haul per ton was half the
national average for roads not reporting ton—mileage, while passenger trips
were assumed to be of equivalent length.This adjustment is preferable to
one based upon mileage coverage of receipts relative to output since the
latter leads to average rates much smaller than those reported elsewhere.
The mileage disparity between receipts and output is probably as large as it
La because of incorrect tabulating of subsidiary roads rather than of actual
differences in coverage.
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Thus an 1839 Laspeyres (or a 1910 Paasche) yields an 1839 output of .03
(1910 =100),whereas the 1910 Laspeyres (or 1839 Paasche) gives a
result almost three times as large.The link-relative index presented
functions like a weighted average of these two extremes, with weights
changing over the course of the period.
As the source notes to Table 1 indicate, 1880 marks the start of official
tabulation of passenger- and ton-miles. Rapidly thereafter, there was a
proliferation of sources so that 1890 affords the option of three alternative
estimates from Poor's Manual, the report of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and the Census volume, Agencies of Transportation. The
latter was used because its coverage is more complete than that of the
other two. By 1900 the ICC's official status and continuous collection of
data led to the cessation of further Census inquiry, and it is these data,
as adjusted by Barger, that are entered here.
For roughly half the period, therefore, no official tallies exist.3 One
survey was taken by the Secretary of the Treasury in 1856, it is true, but
that effort is marred by considerable error.4 The apparent total of 3.4
billion ton-miles for fiscal 1856 must be scaled down by about 1 billion
ton-miles, the output incorrectly reported for a single New York railroad
of insignificant size and a financial failure to boot. That adjustment is
insufficient. For the residual is now too small because many railroads
failed to return ton-miles, even when responding to other parts of the
questionnaire. Stated passenger-miles, although free of gross errors, are
unreliable for the same reason.
Since passenger- and ton-miles were rarely reported by individual
railroads before the Civil War, and tabulated by less than a handful of
states, it is necessary to proceed from receipts. The reduction to physical
quantities is accomplished by dividing through by the average charge
for transport services.This further information on rates is required in
any event to combine passenger- and ton-miles into a single output measure.
Elsewhere I have described in some detail the derivation of the receipts
and rate information for the antebellum period ;5onlya brief summary
There is also a nonofficial, continuous series on ton-miles going back to 1852
developed by Carl Snyder in his BusinessCycles andBusiness Measurements, New York,
1927. This has had a reasonably wide circulation as a consequence of its appearance
in Joseph A. Schumpeter's Business Cycles, New York, 1939. Snyder extrapolated back
from the 1880's on a sample series of ton-miles for the large systems. At its maximum
the coverage is substantial, but for the antebellum period it is limited to four railroads
at most and to only a single road for part of the 1850's. The series is sometimes useful
for cyclical analysis, but the absolute levels are not always reliable, as one would
anticipate from the method of derivation.
It is published in the Report on Finances for 1855-56, S. Ex. Doc. 2, 34th Cong.,
2d Sess.
In Appendix A of Albert Fishlow, American Railroads and the Transformation of
the Ante Bellum Economy (forthcoming), Mass.THE RAILROAD SECTOR, 1840—1910 587
notingthe relative reliability of these estimates is presented here. The
receipts data are of good quality. Less than 10 per cent of the 1839 total
could not be obtained directly, 'and a still smaller 2 per cent in 1849 and
1859 had to be estimated. The allocation of receipts to their passenger
and freight origins is slightly more inexact, but that isstill of small
consequence. The caliber of the passenger and freight rates is subject to
more concern, especially because small absolute errors in these are
transformed into large percentage deviations in the output aggregates.
For 1839, a small sample of roads and the considered judgment of Franz
Anton von Gerstner, a visiting Belgian engineer who chronicled early
American railroad development in a very thorough fashion, must suffice.8
By. 1849 information on rates had become more abundant and a survey
of charges by almost all operating railroads in 1848 forms the basis of the
estimates.7 So detailed is the source that regional, and even state, dis-
aggregation is possible, and this contributes to greater confidence in the
final output entry for that year. The 1859 rates rest upon an elaboration
of the 1855-56 Treasury survey mentioned above. Exact 1855-56 rates
were calculated from simultaneous output and receipts information for
roads carrying 60 per cent of aggregate ton- and passenger-miles. Only
the extension of these rates to 1859 affords a cause for concern, and this
not a serious one. The time span is so short, and rates so stable—as
sample data of individual roads and the state reports of New York and
Massachusetts testify—that the potential error is minimal. Freight rates
were extrapolated on a small sample of roads, chosen for their geographic
representativeness, and passenger rates left unaltered except for a slight
reduction in the initially above-average charges of southern railroads. All
in all, the resultant 1859 output estimates are the best of the antebellum
period and subject to relatively small deviations.
This elaborate procedure for the pre-Civil War years could be avoided
for the 1870 estimate because it was straddled by firm benchmarks in 1880
and 1859 and a suitable interpolating series was available. By that time
the five trunk lines reporting ton-miles at all three dates not only repre-
sented one-fourth of the national aggregate, but a stable proportion as
well.8 Hence interpolation is a quite satisfactory procedure here. And
6Gerstnervisited almost every railroad in the country in the late 1830's and collected
a storehouse of information, published (much of it posthumously) as a series of articles
in 1839—41 in the American Railroad Journal and Journal of the Franklin Institute and
as a two-volume book. in German, Die Innern Communicationen der Vereinigten Staaten
von Nord Amerika, Vienna, 1842-43. There is no question of his knowledgeability.
See American Railroad Journal, Vol. XXI, 1848, pp. 467 if.
SThesample consists of the Boston and Albany, the New York Central, the New
York and Erie, the Pennsylvania, and the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne, and Chicago rail-
roads (see Wholesale Prices, Wages and Transportation, S. Rept. 1394, 52d Cong.,
2d Sess., 1, pp. 618—620).588 SOURCES OF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
although there is no equivalent set of observations for passenger-miles,
the results of extrapolating on Frickey's two sample series—one forward
from 1859, the other backward from 1880—are so close that large errors
are doubtful.9 The average of the respective projections of 4.2 and 4.0
billion passenger-miles is used in Table 1.The same technique applied
to ton-miles yields an estimate almost identical to that obtained by
interpolation, a finding which supports the extrapolation approach and
also the ton-mile estimate itself.
Logarithmic interpolation was also used for 1870 rates. Two alternative
series produced quite similar estimates for the freight rate:the average
New York State rate derived from the state reports for the three years,
and the average rate of a sample of large railroads roughly comparable
to those used in the derivation of 1870 ton-miles.1° The absolute level was
further corroborated by comparison with the average freight charge
reported for thirteen trunk lines in 1870.h1Information on passenger
rates is less abundant and more confusing. The passenger-mile rate on
all New York railroads shows an increase from 1859 to 1870—but only
a moderate one—and a national rate derived from it stands substantially
below the rate reported on the thirteen trunk lines.Since the 1880 rate
of the trunk lines is comparable with the known 1880 national average,
there is a disparity in 1870 between these two methods. With the trend
of the New York State rate also at variance with the movement in the
national rate from 1859 to 1880, the interpolated estimate is further
suspect. In its stead, an average rate somewhat lower than that prevailing
on the thirteen trunk lines, but higher than that indicated by the New York
results, was selected.12
The greater uncertainties of the 1870 rate estimates have less effect on
the accuracy of the final output index than might appear at first blush.
Edwin Frickey, Production inthe UnitedStates, 1860—1914, Cambridge, Mass.,
1947,pp. 87 if.John W. Kendrick also uses Frickey's sample to extrapolate 1880
passenger and ton-miles to an earlier date, 1869.But hedoes not make an adjustment
for the increasing coverage of Frickey's sample over time, and hence underestimates
both passenger- and ton-miles (Kendrick, Productivity Trends, pp. 509—510).
10NewYork Board of Railroad Commissioners, Annual Report on the New York
Railroads, 1859, 1870, and 1880 (title varies);S. Rept. 1394, 1, pp. 615—617. The
sample this time included eight railroads rather than five as before.
"The information on the thirteen lines was gathered by Poor's Manual of Railroads,
and presented in various issues;see, for example, the volume for 1900, p. xlix. The
average of these trunk railroads is some .12 cents less than the 2.11 actually used, a
deviation whose direction is correct and whose magnitude seems to be of the right
order.
Thisprocedure obtains support from a pattern of passenger-rate increase in
Massachusetts during the same interval that is closer to the national trend estimated in
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Inthe first instance, the gross receipts conjointly implied by the output
and rate estimates appear quite consistent with other information in this
sphere. Thus the $388.4 million total for 1870 (including allowance for
additional revenues from mail, express,etc.) compares with Poor's
estimates for 1867 and 1871 of $334.0 and $403.3 million.13 Furthermore,
extrapolation of 1859 and 1880 national receipts upon Frickey's two
sample receipts series yields totals of $386 and $360 million, which at
worst fall within about a 5percent margin of our implied figure. In the
second instance, since it is the relative weight of passenger charges to
freight charges averaged over two decadal observations that determines
the level of the output index, small changes in a single year are of small
matter. As a case in point, if the passenger rate implied by the New York
State series were in fact used, the index for 1859 and 1870 would be
smaller by scarcely more than 1 per cent than the entries in Table 1.
In general, with the availability of official information after 1880 and
the low levels of the index before that date, the advance it portrays—
while subject to the usual disclaimers of perfect representation—is probably
one of our more adequate long-term measures of industrial growth.
Quantitative Measures of Railroad Development,
1840—1910: Capital
The same cannot be said for existing capital estimates. For no part of
the period in question are there official statistics of gross investment in
current dollars, let alone the desired magnitude of the net value of road
and equipment in constant dollars. Capital expenditure was first recorded
by the ICC in 1912 and, although book value was collected from 1890 on,
this is subject to the vagaries of financial manipulation as well as being
limited by its original cost form. This lack led Melville Ulmer to estimate
annual gross and net investment in constant and current dollars, as well
as the capital stock, as far back as the beginning of I Close examina-
tion suggests serious defects in these series that make them unacceptable
for use here, or in many other contexts.Since the data have already
gained a wide audience, it is important to set forth in some detail the
grounds for such a judgment.
The most telling objection is the inconsistency of Ulmer's constant-
dollar estimates with physical series corresponding to various parts of the
13Thesefigures are reprinted from their original source, Poor's Manual, in Historical
Statistics of theUnited States, Colonial Times to 1957, Bureau of the Census, Washing-
ton, 1960, P. 428, Ser. Q-38.
MelvilleJ. Ulmer, Capital in Transportation, Communications, and Public Utilities:
Its Formation and Financing, Princeton for N.BER, 1960, Appendixes A and C.590 SOURCESOF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
capital stock. Thus while Ulmer's value of the capital stock in 1929
dollars increases by 167 per cent over the period 1870—1910, mileage
grows by some 400 per cent (trackage even faster), and equipment goes
up by a larger factor.15 Within certain decades—the 1900's are a prominent
example—the divergence is more striking. To be sure, Ulmer's series is
net whereas trackage and equipment are gross (undepreciated), and this
explains part of the difference. But if Ulmer's stock estimates are recon-
structed gross on the most favorable terms by adding the flow of constant-
dollar, gross investment to the original net value of the capital stock for
1870, the growth rate is increased only to 321 per cent and continues to
be significantly below that of the physical series.Since we would expect
the "true" gross investment series to capture the increasingly important
expenditures on stations, realignment, electrification, etc., not included
in the mileage and equipment series, the shortfall would be still greater if
the two series were of comparable scope.
To appreciate the defects in Ulmer's estimates that contribute to this
inconsistency necessitates a brief description of his method. Ulmer starts
from current-dollar additions to capital account reported by railroads in
certain sample states and sample years.National investment for the
sample years is equal to the sample total scaled up by the ratio of national
book value of road and equipment to book value of the reporting roads;
interpolation on a trackage series fills in the missing years. The total
investment in current dollars during the interval 1870—1915 is then checked
by comparing this sum with the change in original cost of road and
equipment over the period. The two magnitudes are almost identical, a
finding which Ulmer takes as confirmation both of a low level of retire-
ments—cumulative gross investment should include expenditures for
equipment replacement whereas original cost will not be affected—and
of the correctness of his investment flows. The resultant annual series
is converted to 1929 dollars by applying a weighted price index of input
components, namely, labor, building materials, metals, and implements.
A depreciation rate applicable to current-dollar investment is derived
from unpublished ICC calculations and some skillful manipulation. The
capital stock estimates in constant dollars follow from an adjusted ICC
1936 benchmark; values for later years are the 1936 value plus cumulative
net constant-dollar investment; values for earlier years, the 1936 value
less cumulative net investment.
16Formileage changes and the terminal stock of trackage and equipment, see
Historical Statistics, 1960,. pp. 427 if.Trackage and equipment estimates have been
made for 1870 and are presented as part of this paper.THE RAILROAD SECTOR, 1840—1910 591
Despite its frequent ingenuity and a welcome reliance upon the rich
resources of railroad reports, Ulmer's technique is seriously marred by
inadequate execution.Specifically, the cumulative gross investment flow
in current dollars is both understated and subject to important distortions
in its annual distribution. A dubious price deflator compounds these
difficulties, and thereby contributes to the further underestimate of the
growth of the capital stock from 1870 to 1910.
Current-dollar gross investment is not large enough, principally because
Ulmer misinterprets nineteenth century railroad accounting categories.
Until the ICC regulations of 1907 instituted depreciation accounting, the
practice of replacement accounting was almost universal.16With the
latter, equipment replacements—that is, retirements—were charged to
current operating expenses at the time expenditures were made, and no
entry ever appeared in the capital account. Hence Ulmer's exclusive focus
on the capital account excludes one component of gross investment.
Were retirements as modest as the $239 million Ulmer finds during
the period 1870—1914, this objection, however valid, would not be vital.
The point is that this estimate of retirements and the simultaneous check
upon the magnitude of cumulative gross investment are both far off the
mark. The basic identity involved, which can be writtengross invest-
book value of road and equipment7 minus book value of road
and equipment0 minus plus is obviously not
at fault. But the estimate of 1870 book value, $3.4 billion, is. This figure
is the result of linear interpolation between 1860 and 1876 book values,
a procedure justifiable only if approximately equal absolute increments
to the capital account occurred in each of the intervening years. In fact,
the average annual increment in mileage (a reasonable proxy for investment
despite changing price levels) was about 1,500 miles during the period
1860—69, against more than 4,000 miles from 1870 to 1876. We expect,
therefore, that the true book value at the beginning of 1870 should be
smaller than $3.4 billion. And so it is. The American Railroad Journal
tabulation of construction accounts of individual roads yields a more
For rapid confirmation of this point one need only examine the very state reports
Ulmer used in making up his sample investment series. In Massachusetts in 1873, for
example, all roads clearly charged such replacement purchases of new equipment to
current account. Also see the reports of individual companies like the Baltimore and
Ohio, Lake Shore and Michigan Southern, and others, where clear distinction is made
between replacements and additions to the capital stock in reckoning changes in
construction account.592 SOURCES OF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
appropriate $2.2 billion.17 Substitution of this value in the above formula
suggests a deficiency of cumulative current-dollar gross investment of well
over $1 billion, and thus over 10 per cent of Ulmer's sum.
Indeed, if we apply this method rigorously, and substitute an independent
estimate of retirements derived from a model to be described presently,
it suggests possible additional understatement from sources other than
exclusion of retirements. Thus the correct difference in book value from
1870 to 1910 is $12.4 billion which, with the addition of estimated retire-
ments of $1 billion, brings gross investment to $13.4 billion less write-ups
over the period. The ICC estimate of original cost in 1915, when its
series began, is only 8.8 per cent less than the corresponding book value,
and if this is accepted as a measure of write-up included in the latter, the
cumulative investment is reduced to $12.3 billion or $1.6 billion more than
Ulmer's series during the same interval. On the other hand, it may well
be that the ICC original cost estimates, composed as they were largely
of reproduction costs in 1914 prices, understate the write-up inherent in
the book value statement.'8Certainly Poor's Manual, a competent
contemporary authority, suggests a higher margin, as does the qualitative
evidence of the era.'9 A more ample allowance still supports my basic
contention that retirements are excluded from Ulmer's estimates, and that
they represented a sizable proportion of gross investment.
Not only is the total flow from 1870 to 1910 too small, but also its
distribution through time is irregular. Ulmer does nothing to ensure that
the level of investment in his various sample years is consistent with the
level of the expenditure index used to interpolate changes between such
years. That is, if in a given year x miles of trackage is built and sample
investment is y, in a subsequent year trackage can well be 2x and sample
American Railroad Journal, Vol. XLIII, 1870, p. 2. Had Ulmer even consulted
Historical Statistics (1949, p. 201, Ser. K-18 and K-19), the excess of his estimate would
have become apparent.
18Theoriginal cost series can be found in W. H. S. Stevens, Analysis of Steam
Railway Dividends, Interstate Commerce Commission, Washington, 1943, Table H.
Ulmer reprints it in his Table C-12.
Stevens (ibid., p. 43, n. 3) describes the method of its derivation.There can be
little doubt that much of the original cost at that early date was estimated by taking
reproduction costs in 1910—14 prices.In the valuation cases before the Commission
at the time, actual original costs were a rarity. Moreover, an original cost figure even
from company records easily might embody the implicit exaggeration associated with
payment to contractors in securities accepted at par but actually selling at less than
the market price.
Poor'sManual for 1900 (pp. liv if.) asserts that some 40 per cent of the capital stock
outstanding in that year was fictitious. Even if all bonds were sold at par, total Cost
would be overstated by about 20 per cent, and correspondingly more dependent upon
the actual discount on bonds. The implication of the ICC estimate that there was no
write-up by 1914 is doubtful at best.THE RAILROAD SECTOR, 1840—1910 593
investmentafter price changes are taken into account. So, although
the expenditure index in the early 1900's stands at levels as great as those
of the early 1870's, investment comes to just half as much. Since the
ratio of equipment to trackage increased rapidly in the later decades,
along with other capital expenditures, the difference is not due to the
limitations of the index, which is biased in exactly the opposite direction.
The failure to gear the value estimates properly to the underlying physical
series is the fundamental flaw. It leads not only to cumulative and decadal
distortion but also to annual misrepresentation.In no fewer than six
pairs of years do changes in Ulmer's expenditures and expenditure index
diverge in direction:1876-77, 1888-89, 1891-92, 1895-96, 1905-06, and
1908-09. A particularly striking case is 1891-92. The 1891 sample yields
expenditures of $234 million, that of 1892, $251 million, but trackage
opened in the latter year is less than half that in the former. Poor. methods
of interpolation and of sampling are responsible for these incongruities.
Allowance for the lead of outlays over track emplacement and incorpora-
tion of equipment changes in the index would improve the annual dis-
tribution.Stratification of the sample roads into those in the process of
extension and those building de novo would tie the levels of the value
estimates more closely to the interpolating index than simple escalation
by the ratio of assets does.
As mentioned earlier, the conversion of these imperfect current-dollar
investment flows to real terms makes matters still worse. As is often done
for construction investment, a price index of inputs is used to deflate
current expenditures. But since labor bulks large as an input, the part
of increased wages that reflects productivity change in the building trades
results in substantial exaggeration of the increased price of final output.
Labor productivity had an upward trend over the period, and thus the
measured change in the real capital stock is biased downward. Adding
to this defect, which is admittedly difficult to circumvent, is the selection
of a bad index. In particular, the price of metal inputs is an unweighted
conglomeration of prices of door knobs, butcher knives, and files, among
others, but not of steel rails.2° At the end of the century, rails were perhaps
the largest single metallic input in value, and subject to a sharp downward
trend in price. From 1880 to 1889, their price plummeted from $67.52
a ton to $29.25, a decline of almost 60 per cent, but the Ulmer index
declines only 25 per cent. In addition, the weights of the index allot less
20Thisis the Aldrich Committee unweighted index of prices of metal implements
(excluding pocket knives) contained in S. Rept. 1394. The composition would be
irrelevant as long as the series moved approximately like a rail-price series. The point
made here, however, is that it does not.594 SOURCESOF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
importance to metal inputs than is appropriate and more to other materials
with a lesser rate of price decline.21 The combination of these two factors
is sufficient to transform a correctly weighted aggregate price reduction
perhaps as great as 30 per cent into price stability during the decade. As
a consequence, real capital formation at the beginning of the 1880's is
overstated relative to that at the end, and it is toward the end that the
large spurt of current-dollar outlay occurred. The use of a skilled-wage
series rather than one for laborers and of a materials index comparable
in its misrepresentation to the metals index distorts the real series as well,
but the effects are not as obvious.
This rejection of Ulmer's post-1870 estimates made it impossible to
link my own pre-Civil War investment series to his in 1870, as had been
originally intended. Complete correction of his series was not feasible
because of the incomplete detail of the published materials; nor in any
event would it represent the most efficient method of deriving continuous
and consistent capital-stock estimates of the sort required here. For this
limited objective, an approach from the physical rather than the value
side seems especially promising. Few industries possess such extensive
records of physical components of the capital stock, namely, trackage
and equipment, which retain reasonable homogeneity over time and which
encompass such a large proportion of total investment. On the other
hand, the resultant estimates are only a partial replacement for Ulmer's
comprehensive coverage of the sector. The task of reworking his invest-
ment series, both current and constant, to correct for the error in trend
and the annual aberrations still awaits attention.
The construction of capital-stock estimates from physical components
is not without its difficulties. Despite the notable extent to which capital
expenditures consisted of additions to trackage and rolling stock, over
time there was some substitution of other outlays, for stations, realignment
of way, electrification, and so forth.But these introduce only a small
bias, if any, during the period of our interest, aperiodof initial extension
of the system. As late as 19 14—18, equipment alone accounted for more
than 40 per cent of total investment, and such direct outlays associated
with construction of road—like grading, track laying, rails, and ties,
etc.—make up more than half the residual.In total, therefore, the
activities to which the index is most obviously sensitive represent almost
three-fourths of capital expenditure, and if an allowance were made for
the "usual" amount of station and shop construction associated with
21Ulmer'sweights of 4.8 for other materials—4 for labor and 1.2 for metals—are
derived from maintenance outlays of class 1 roads in 1925 and 1935 and are singularly
inappropriate to initial construction of road in the late nineteenth century.THE RAILROAD SECTOR, 1840—1910 595
mileage extension, an even higher proportion.Very much earlier a
similar ratio was not very different—85 per cent in the 1850's—and the
maintenance of such a continuing high level so late leaves little scope
for trend distortion in a combined trackage and equipment index.22
Accordingly, in the absence of firm indications of the temporal incidence
and magnitude of changing coverage, no adjustment is made here.
Another and more serious problem arises from the changing nature of
the physical units over time. On the one hand, there is technological
change. An index of equipment designed to measure changes in this
segment of the capital stock cannot treat the primitive 10-ton locomotives
of the 1830's the same as the later behemoths; nor can a trackage index
fail to differentiate between mileage laid with strap iron and later with
steel rails. On the other hand, there were geographic shifts in construction
that were associated with altered real costs: a mile on the prairies of the
Middle West was not as expensive as one scaling the Rocky Mountains.
The principle involved is clear. Each physical unit, whether of track or
equipment, should be weighted by its cost of reproduction in the prices
and technology of a given year before being compared. In this way, one
gets a consistent measure of the capital stock over time, where real
investment is measured, as is conventional, by its cost, not its capacity.23
In the subsequent calculations we apply this rule, as far as the data permit,
to deal both with technological change and the aggregation of different
types of track—main, second, yard, etc.—and equipment at a moment
of time.
No geographic weights are used, however. The shift in the regional
concentration of construction is dramatic—almost one-third of total 1890
mileage was located in states west of the Missouri compared with
one-tenth in 1870—but its significance depends upon the interregional
variance of costs of road construction, and these are surprisingly limited.
Total cost per mile of track in the eight regions distinguished in Poor's
Manual ranges from $35,000 to $73,000, with six of the observations
clustered from $35,000 to $45,000.24 The differences here are exaggerated
22ICC,Statistics of Railways in the United States for 1918, p. 87; for comparable
distribution in the 1850's (after subtraction for excess interest and discount charged to
construction account), see my American Railroads, Table B-4.
23Itis well to point out two characteristics of this technique. First, the choice of a
technology base is effectively limited to later years, since the type of construction
before that date could be duplicated, whereas the same condition does not hold for
early years.Second, there may well be different results corresponding to different
technology bases, since the range of products that must be reproduced may be rela-
tively cheaper to duplicate at different later dates.
Poor'sManual for 1891, pp. ii, iii, and xviii, The slightly different Census regions
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NOTESTO TABLE 2 (concluded)
1858:0.10 change in mileage between 1848 and 1858 plus 1,700miles
of 1860 double track interpolatedto1858, as above.
1869:Averageof 1858and1879ratiosofothertrack tomileagetimes1869
mileage.
1879—1909:Same asmain track, 1899—09.
Col.3:Ccl. 1 +.5col. 2.
Col.4:See text.
Col. 5:Col. 4, converted to an index with 1909 base, weighted one—third.
Thus the 1838 value, 78.6, is equal to + 200.0/300.0.
Col. 6:Cal. 3 x col. 5.
Col. 7:Cumulative depreciationtcumulative depreciationt10
+10 x .01.
x(col. +5x .01.x (col.
Cal. 8:Col. 6 —col.7.
aThese years have been selected to conform as nearly as possible to the
midpoints of the years for which Output has been estimated.From 1880 on,
the calendar—year basis of the stocks and the fiscal—year basis of the out-
put flows result in perfect agreement,Beforehand, because of a later
fiscal year, the stock may be centered slightly before the midpoint.
owingto variations in rollingstock per mile; roads in the Middle Atlantic
group,with the highest cost, operated less than one-sixth of the mileage
but one-third of the equipment. Total cost divided only by trackage thus
distorts the extent of regional differences in construction of road. None-
theless, even these imperfect weights applied to the mileage increase from
1870 to 1890 produce a rate of change of only 215 per cent, as opposed
to 200 per cent for the unadjusted totals. Accordingly, the price paid for
the neglect of this complication is small.
Table 2 presents the calculations translating the initial mileage series
into an index of real capital invested in road and structures according
to the principle of equivalent costs.First, the mileage of main-line and
other track have been aggregated into the single, uniform trackage series
in column 3 by assigning weights of 1 andrespectively.This approxi-
mate relative cost of other track has been derived from both financial and
engineering considerations. We start from the general observation that,
despite large changes in relative prices over the period, direct super-
structure costs do not deviate much from 30 per cent of the total expense
of construction. To this outlay for track must be added the investment
in the permanent way, grading, masonry, and so on. For double, third,
and fourth track, this did not escalate proportionally, but by a much
smaller factor. Two engineers, arguing from technical considerations,
claim the incremental investment in this other construction to be less than
50 per cent of that required for first track. A weight of one-half for double598 SOURCESOF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
and other main-line track is therefore suggested.25 The same value is
used for sidings, although the possible substitution of lighter rails could
reduce the proportion somewhat; however, one railroad commission
valuation in the opening years of the twentieth century indicates a relative
cost of .55,sothe one-half weight cannot be too far off the mark.26 Yard
track is assigned the same weight also. Although newly constructed from
the start, because the selection of the site was determined by advantageous
physical circumstances—and hence less excavation, grading, etc.—and
because multiple tracks were always involved, the per unit cost of the
trackage inevitably was less than that for first main track.In the most
unfavorable circumstances, where only two tracks were built upon a
substructure as expensive as the average for main line, the per mile relative
cost for yard trackage would be .75.Forparallel trackage many times
greater, built under favorable conditions, the previous one-half weight
therefore retains its applicability. This is fortunate, since the distinction
among the various types of other track is never very clear in the mileage
statistics until very late in the period.
The second step in the process is to convert the equivalent main track
miles of the various dates to equivalent mileage of a specific date. This
requires temporal relative cost weights to supplement the previous cross-
sectional ones.That is, we must determine what it would have cost
to construct the mileage at the specified dates, with 1909 prices and
technology, but as it actually was; this cost relative to 1909 costs can then
be used to derive a new mileage series homogeneous through time.
The most apparent way in which mileage differed over time is the
increase in rail weights. A network laid in the 1830's principally with
strap iron of 25 gross tons to the mile gave way to one in the first decade
of the twentieth century with steel rails weighing something like 115 gross
tons to the mile. At a minimum, therefore, the rail component of total
investment in road must be reduced in earlier years relative to 1909 if
temporal uniformity is to prevail. At a maximum, all investment could
25SeeW. M. Camp, Notes on Track, Chicago, 1904, p. 623; and Arthur Wellington,
The Economic Theory of the Location of Railways, 6th ed., New York, 1887, p. 765.
Wellington frames his judgment directly in terms of theincrementto total Cost as-
sociated with the additional grading and masonry. His 10 to 15 per cent increment to
total cost is roughly equivalent to Camp's evaluation of a 50 per cent increase in sub-
structure outlays, since grading and masonry made up about 40 per cent of the total.
The addition of the 10 to 20 per cent required for the substructure of a double track
to direct superstructure outlays of about 30 per cent leads to the total incremental cost
of one-half used here. (Wellington's 10 to 15 per cent range is probably too low because
it excludes some other variable costs like interest, station facilities, etc., and that is the
reason for a one-half weight rather than something smaller.)
26Citedin F. Lavis, Railway Estimates, New York, 1917, pp. 35—36.THE RAILROAD SECTOR, 1840—1910 599
bescaled in this manner if the increase in rail weights represented parallel
improvements in the substructure, bridges, shops, and so on. We follow
an intermediate course here, and allocate to the variation in rail weights
shown in column 4 an influence of one-third the approximate relative
importance of the entire superstructure in order to derive the index of
resource content in column 5.Therationale for such a weight is the
constancy of quality of much of railroad investment over time. Excavation
and grading, masonry work, and the like were probably as well done in
the antebellum period as at the end of the nineteenth century, quite
independently of the continuous improvement in superstructure.All
expenditure on the superstructure is considered, because not only did
rail weights increase, but the number of ties per mile, the depth of ballast,
the type of rail chairs, and other costs of the superstructure also changed
as the rails did. Two cross-section observations are relevant here. The
first is the evidence that the investment in the substructure at a moment
in time is determined by the circumstances of terrain, etc., and not by
rail weight. The second is the almost proportional movement of rail
weights and costs per mile for the entire superstructure (of which direct
purchases of rails constitute less than half); as rail weights increase from
50 to 60 to 80 to 100 pounds per yard, estimated costs climb from $7,600
to $8,800 to $10,600 to $12,300 a mile.27Although neither piece of
evidence relates exactly to the problem at hand—and could not since our
difficulties lie with reconstructing the unobserved—they do afford some
support for our decision to weight the increased size of rails only by the
superstructure component of road investment and not to apply it either
more or less universally. That costs perhaps did not increase quite as
rapidly as rail weight did provides a small additional, and warranted,
allowance for the better bridges and other structures along the line.
Since the index in column 5iscentral to the final results, it may be well
to emphasize its insensitivity to errors in the average rail weights specified
in column 4. These last are only approximations, based upon scattered
contemporary reports on the subject, except for the terminal observations.
The 1838 weight is firmly established from Gerstner's researches into the
type and weight of rail on almost all railroads then in operation. Similarly
the 1909 observation is sufficiently close to the first ICC report on the
subject in 1920 so that its order of magnitude is well founded. The
27Ibid.,pp.34,240.Differentrelative prices of superstructure inputs will influence
the results, of course. At this date, the first decade of the twentieth century, rails were
relatively cheap. The more expensive rail costs are, the more nearly proportional is
the movement. Over much of the period, therefore, the relationship was presumably
better than that described here.600 SOURCES OF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
gradations from decade to decade are limited in importance because of
the minor weight attached to the series ;28from1848 to 1909, while rail
weight goes up almost by 50 per cent, the index goes up by 9 per cent.
The crucial assumption, therefore, is the one-third weight to be assigned
to the rail index rather than the precision of that index itself.
The series of 1909 equivalent main track miles must be further adjusted
to reflect depreciation if it is to measure the capital stock at various dates.
Wear of rails and ties can be excluded because their lives are short, and
their replacement is implicit in the trackage. figures.(Of course, to the
extent that renewals are not exactly uniform, the proportion of track
requiring replacement may differ slightly in each of the terminal years of
Table 2, and may thereby distort short-term comparisons.)For the
inevitable obsolescence of the more permanent components of the road,
such as earthworks, culverts, etc., and for shorter-lived structures inade-
quately maintained, a 1 per cent charge per annum is levied. This corre-
sponds to the ICC finding of 0.86 per cent in 1917 and 0.82 per cent in 1949,
and is set slightly higher to reflect the small increase in longevity of the
permanent way over time.29In addition, because the depreciation
allowance is deliberately applied to the mileage series unadjusted for
resource content (column 3), the effective rate is tapered downward from
1.28 per cent in the 1830's to 1 per cent in the early twentieth century.
Subtracting the cumulative depreciation so calculated in column 7 from
the gross series of column 6 yields the final net series in column 8.
Tables 3 to 5presenta transformation of equipment to 1909 equiv-
alent freight cars through application of the same real cost principle.
The procedure in this instance is slightly more complicated because the
shorterlifeof equipment necessitates the derivation of production
statistics rather than simple manipulation of the stocks as before. The
stock of locomotives, passenger cars, and freight cars is already reduced
to a quasi-net basis owing to prior retirements, but it also contains an
element of depreciation which can be determined only by exact knowledge
of its vintage. Hence the need for production statistics.
28Theallocation to intervening years is intended to convey a consensus of comment
on the trend to heavier rails. For the antebellum years, see my American Railroads.
Subsequently, cf. Railway Gazette, Vol. IV, 1872, p. 107; XII, 1880, p. 334; Wellington,
Economic Theory, p. 119; Lavis, Railway Estimates, p. 242.
Note that there is no distinction here between iron and steel rails since in 1909 their
prices had converged to the point where no significant difference between the two
existed.Since 1909 technology is the basis of the reduction, it is conditions at the
latter date that are relevant.
89Theseare cited by Ulmer, Capital in Transportation, p. 225. For evidence of pre-
Civil War rates of similar (but slightly higher) magnitude, see my American Railroads,
Appendix B.THE RAILROAD SECTOR, 1840—1910 601
Table 3 presents their determination from prior information on the
stocks and the retirement rates. The stock at any date is equal to the
stock a decade earlier plus intervening purchases, less intervening retire-
ments. Once the retirement rates are specified, retirements are determined,
and purchases then follow directly. The equipment lives used in Table 3
are twenty years for both locomotives and freight cars, and twenty-five
years for passenger cars (with the exception that twenty years has been
applied to the production of the 1830's). These are a fair consensus of
informed engineering opinion, and they incorporate a longer service life
over time, since the average mileage run each year showed an upward
tendency.3° Fortunately, the validity of the assumptions can be checked
from 1879 on by comparing the implied production estimates against




Predicted 18,957 18,326 40,893
Produced 17,200 17,060 44,234
Passengercars
Predicted 16,771 13,022 25,015
Produced 12,857 11,393 25,113
Freight cars
Predicted 686,701 643,819 1,473,837
Produced 532,400 723,900 1,455,300
The large overstatement of the 1880's is as much due to the inadequate
coverage of the production series as to the inaccuracy of the retirement
model. The production series excludes rather extensive production by
railroad repair shops. As late as 1900, railroads themselves produced an
addition of 20—25 per cent to commercial output of cars and the trend,
if any, would make the earlier proportion even larger. Self-manufacture
of locomotives was less widespread. The inclusion of exports in the
production tabulation only partially offsets the understatement, since
these amounted but to 5 per cent of output.32 For the same reason, the
closer correspondence after the 1880's exaggerates the adequacy of fit.
80Forretirement ages, see Wellington, Economic Theory, p. 419;J. L. Ringwalt,
Development of Transportation Systems in the United States, Philadelphia, 1888, p. 320;
Railroad Gazette, Vol. XVIII, 1886, pp. 201, 869; Emory Edwards, Modern American
Locomotive Engines, Philadelphia, 1883, p. 119.
Theseproduction statistics come from Historical Statistics, 1960, p. 416, Ser.
P-213-215.
32TwelfthCensus, 1900, Vol. X, Special Reports on Selected Industries, pp. 273 and
279, gives production of cars in railroad repair shops. For the importance of exports,
see William Howard Shaw, Value of Commodity Output Since 1869, New York, NBER,
1947, pp. 56—57.TABLE 3












1838 375 417 1,250









1879 17,084 16,528 480,190
1889 30,566 28,524 1,051,141
1999 37,183 34,282 1,330,520
1909 59,119 46,422 2,117,656
RETIREMENTS PURCHASES
1829—38 375 417 1,250
1839—48 793 821 13,165
1849—58 375 417 1,250 4,365 3,882 67,237
1859—69 950 533 16,000 5,792 5,830 120,598
1870—79 4,525 2,450 69,250 11,609 8,978 364,440
1880—89 5,475 4,775 115,750 18,957 16,771 686,701
1890—99 11,609 7,264 364,440 18,226 13,022 643,819
1900—09 18,957 12,875 686,701 40,893 25,0151,473,837
Source
Stock
See my Railroads1 Appendix D, for estimates of equipment stocks
at end of 1839, 1849, and 1859.These were extended to the stated years (after
allowance for replacements in the instance of 1858) by an annual series of
locomotive production to be found in ibid., Appendix 8, Table 8—8.
These are approximated to the nearest thousand and are derived by interpo-
lating the aggregate ratio of each type of equipment to earnings on the sample
ratios derived from twenty—five railroads reporting at the three dates, 1859,
1869, 1880.Thesample was representative at the terminal dates of 1859 and 1880;
that is, the sample ratios corresponded to the national ratios, so interpolation
is a satisfactory procedure.The sample data came from the share lists of the
AmericanRailroadJournal in 1860 and 1870, and the 1880 Census.The aggregate
fiscal 1870 receipts needed to convert the ratios to absolute stocks are esti-
mated from the physical outputs and are discussed above.
The final estimates are consistent with the contemporary report of 10,000
locomotives and 214,000 cars in the early 1870's (Railway Gazette,, Vol. III,
1873, p. 287).
1879—1909tSame as trackage; see Table 2,
Retirements: for locomotives and freight cars;
for passenger cars, after 1829—38.A linear distribution of production was
assumed to obtain (Since there is one eleven—year interval from
1859 to 1869, the formula had to be adjusted for the estimated output in the
overlapping year; this is the reason for the lack of exact correspondence between
retirements and production entries two decades previously for some of the
figures.)
urchasea;Equalschange in stocks plus retirements.
5lneludes baggage and mail cars in passenger service.For 1838—58, the number
of cars is given in terms of eight—wheel equivalents.Thereafter, most cars took
this form, with the exception of' some twelve—wheel cars.
bFcr 1838—58, noncoalcars in eight—wheel equivalents.Thereafter, most box
cars were of this variety.Coal cars are reported as units, and no attempt has
been made to tender the gradual change from four—wheel to eight—wheel cars.
1869, since an earnings estimate was essential to the method, the equipment
stock corresponds more closely to the end of the output year rather than its mid-
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Butonly in the instance of freight car output in the 1890's is)he divergence
—including an allowance for understatement in the production series—
troublesome. Even here, the apparent understatement of retirements only
lends authority to our expressed view of the seriousness of their neglect
by Ulmer. From 1870 through 1909, we estimate retirements at 40,666
locomotives, 27,364 passenger cars, and 1,236,141 freight cars. At prices
of $8,000 per locomotive, $2,500 per passenger car, and $400 per freight
car—prices that are among the lowest of the period—retirements are seen
to amount to $900 million, or far more than the Ulmer results yield.33
Just as adjustment for changes in the weight of rails increased the
comparability of the trackage series over time, so the weight of equipment
provides initial guidelines for a similar transformation to a consistent real
cost standard. The average weight of engines rose from something like
10 tons in the 1830's to exactly 72 tons in 1909 as measured by an ICC
count. The increase in weight seems to have been fairly regular, and
modest, until the 1870's. Then the introduction of the Mogul and Consóli-
dation types to replace the standard American 4-4-0 led to more rapid
change. Accompanying this acceleration, and interdependent with it, was
the development of more capacious freight cars. Not only did the use
of steel in trucks and underframes make possible an increase in size with
far less than proportional investment, but also newer designs using
conventional materials ôame forth as soon as driving power was available.34
Therefore the virtual doubling of capacity between the 1870's and 1880's
was accomplished with little increase in dead weight (and resource cost).
83Forprices twice as large as these in the 1870's, see Railway Gazette, Vol. III, 1873,
p. 34, and Vol. 1, 1871, p. 516.These prices are representative of the 1880's (cf.
Wellington, Economic Theory, pp. 163, 411, and 565).In 1889 the average price of
locomotives was $8,200, and in 1899, $9,500; in the latter year, passenger cars were
sold at $7,500 and freight cars at $530. By 1909 the three types of equipment were
priced at $12,065, $8,638, and $843. All these prices, except that for locomotives in
1909, come directly from Census reports. The 1909 locomotive price was calculated
by multiplying the 1899 price by the ratio of the prices of locomotives manufactured in
railroad repair shops at the two dates, i.e., P1909 =P1899x P'19o9IP11899, where p1 is the
price of locomotives built in repair shops and is given in the Census. This technique is
necessary because the average locomotive built by railroads themselves was undoubtedly
larger than average since such railroads h.ad heavier traffic than average.
Credit for the rapid increase in the ratio of payload to dead weight before 1900
must be sought elsewhere than in the use of steel. As late as June 30, 1915, out of some
55,000 passenger cars only 10,884 were steel and 5,197 had steel underframes. Freight
cars took part in this materials revolution to a greater degree: of more than 2,300,000
freight cars, 515,000 were steel (almost all for the transportation of coal) and another
681,000 had steel underframes (ICC, Statistics of Railways in the United States for
1915, pp. 22—23).
In light of this record, it is difficult to attribute the early decline in the dead-weight
ratio to the substitution of steel. That transformation, with its significant productivity
effects, discussed later, is one that will repay much more careful study.604 SOURCESOF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
TABLEL+
REAL COST OF
Index of Index of
Index of Passenger—. Real Cost,Freight—Real Costs,
t.ooomotiveReal Cost, Car Passenger Car Freight
Weight Locomotivel Weight Cars Weight Cars
(tons) (1909100) (tons) (tons) (1909—100)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1830—38 10 42.6 14 48.7 8.0 56.6
1839—46 20 51.8 14 48.7 8.0 56.6
1849—58 25 56.5 14 48.7 8.0 56.6
1858—69 30 61.1 16 52.8 10.0 65.7
1870—79 35 65.7 20 61.0 11.0 70.3
1880—89 45 75.0 . 27 75.4 12.5 77.1
1890—99 58 87.0 35 91.8 15.7 91.8
1900—09 78 105.6 45 112.3 18.3 103.7
1909 72 100.0 39 100.0 17.5 100.0
Source
Col. 1, 1830—1858:Railway and Locomotive Historical Society Bulletin, No. 35,
1934, pp. 10—37.
Col. 1, 1858—1909:Ibid.; Wellington, Economic Theory, pp. 407, 499, 544.Twelfth
Censue, 1900, Vol. X, Manufacturing, p. 245.ICC, Statistics of Rail-ways for 1902
and 1909, giving average weights at those dates.
Col. 2:2/3 (weightt +
100 0
\weight 1900—091
Col.3:3. L. lUngwalt, Development of Transportation Systems in the United States,
Philadelphia, 1888, p. 337; Wellington, Economic Theory, p. 524; Edwin Pratt,





Col. 5:Ringwalt, Development of Transportation, p. 336; Wellington, Economic
Theory, pp. 114, 135; National Car Builder, Vol. VIII, 1877, p. 9; Pratt,
AmericanRailways, p.51; Master Car Builder's Association, CarBuilder's
Diotionaz.yfor 1906, New York, 1906, pp. 166 ff. Twelfth Census, 1880, Vol. X,
SpeoialReports on Manufactures, p.264.ICC, Statistics of Railways for 1902
and 1909, giving average capacities at those dates.For the fares associated
withthosecapacities, see Car Builder's Dictionary.
Col. 4/5(wei8htt +
100.0. \ve1ght1900_09J 5THE RAILROAD SECTOR, 1840—1910 605
From the 1880's to the first part of the twentieth century another doubling
in capacity occurred, again with less than equivalent increases in weight.
Precise information is lacking on the development of passenger cars, but
it seems a substantial upgrading of passenger comfort occurred during
the latter part of the nineteenth century. Giant palace and sleeping cars,
as well as the enlargement of the more prosaic coaches, contributed to
perhaps a tripling in the average size of units between the antebellum
decades and 1910. Moreover, increased relative prices of passenger cars
versus freight cars testify to this greater change in real costs in the former.
Table 4 summarizes this history.Associated with the weight changes
are real cost changes but, as before, not in exact proportion. Fortunately,
there is more to go on here than the indirect methods used to convert
variations in rail weight to variations in unit resource consumption.
Actual prices of locomotives per unit weight at a moment of time afford
a measure of the relationship we are after. What data have been found
tend to indicate a decline in cost per ton as size increases, that is, a change
in real cost substantially smaller than the simple increase in weight. Thus,
in 1876, as locomotives increased in weight from 20 to 40 tons, the price
went up from $7,000 to $9,200.In another instance ten years later,
Baldwin locomotives varied from a 24-ton American to a 59-ton Consolida-
tion, with selling prices rising from only $5,750 to $9,750. The marginal
cost was only $110 per ton against an average cost of almost $250 per ton
for the smaller unit.Later, in 1906, the same circumstances prevailed:
a 40-ton freight engine was quoted at $8,000; an 80-ton engine, at $12,800;
and a 140-ton engine, at $20,160.Over a somewhat narrower range,
from 46 to 60 tons, a final observation dating from the late 1880's reveals
constant unit costs.35All four bodies of information diverge from the
findings of Dorothy S. Brady which assert increasing unit prices over the
size range.36
Despite this unsatisfactory current state of knowledge about price-size
relationships for locomotives, I have accepted the evidence pointing to a
declining cost pattern. Materials inputs made up only slightly more than
half the expense of locomotive production, so doubling of size would
yield increased costs of only 50 per cent on this account. For such a
specialized industry as locomotive production in which engineering salaries
and wages of skilled workmen loom large, and with machine tools capable
Wellington, Economic Theory, pp. 411 and 565; Lavis, Railway Estimates, p. 418;
The American Railway, New York, 1889, p. 126.
36Seeher "Relative Prices in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of Economic History,
June 1964, especially Table 2. The evidence presented here also seems to contradict
her generalization of price-size relationships to either increasing or U-shaped forms.TABLE 5
STOCK OF IN1909 EQUIVALENTS
Gross Net Gross Net Cross Net
Stock, Stock, Stock, Stock, Stock, Stock,
End of Loco— Loco— Passenger Passenger Freight Freight
Year motives motives Cars Cars Cars Cars
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1838 160 114 203 152 708 531
1848 571 348 603 371 8,159 5,765
1858a
2,877 1,952 2,290 1,672 45,507 30,405
'869a
5,924 3,102 5,108 3,130 115,684 65,645
1879a
10,994 6,562 9,391 5,617 332,689 211,273
1889 21,867 12,570 19,585 12,453 786,087 461,135
1899b
30,097 15,447 27,336 14,895 1,120,912 575,631
1909 59,062 36,352 46,367 27,888 2,119,865 1,294,033
Source
Gross stock of all types of equipment:
Cola. 1, 3, 6:(productiont times index of real costt) minus (retirententst
index of real costt), where the inputs are taken from Table 3 and 4.
Cola. 2, 6:.75 productiont_9_tplus .25 productiont_19_t_iü.
Col. 4:.8production pius .4 production plus .1 (.5) pro— t—9—t1 t—19—t—10
duct iont—29—t—20.
is some small modification in these years of the formulae for the
derivation of the net stock due to the eleven—year interval from 1858 to 1869,
and hencea slightly different average age of equiptnent.
bThe 1909 entries deviate from the comparablegross stocks of Table 3 only
because of rounding.
TABLE 6
REAL NET CAPITAL STOCK, 1838—1909
(million1909 dollars)
End of Index Index,
Year Equipment Track Totala Variant II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1838 2.9 79.8 82.7 0.8 0.8
1848 11.4 219.4 230.8 2.2 2.3
1858 59.2 1,000.11,059.2 10.1 10.6
1869 111.7 1,629.41,741.1 16.6 17.3
1879 286.1 3,011.2 3,297.4 31.5 32.5
1889 606.8 5,867.26,474.0 61.9 63.7
1899 749.6 6,811.0 7,560.6 72.3 74.2
1909 1,658.2 8,799.710,457.9 100.0 100.0
Source
Col. 1:Net stock of locomotives times $11,000; net stock of passenger
cars times $8,000; net stock of freight cars times $800.
Col. 2:Net surviving mileage times $40,200.
Col. 3sCol. 1 plus col. 2.
Col. 4:Total divided by 10,457.9.
Cal. 5:Index of col. 1 times .1. plus index of col. 2 times .9.
aMay not add to total because of rounding.THE RAILROAD SECTOR, 1840—1910 607
ofturning out a variety of shapes and sizes, the variable costs of other
inputs well might decline per unit, and it is difficult to imagine their increase.
In the subsequent calculations, therefore, I have allowed all materials
inputs to increase proportionally with the increase of weight, but only
about three-tenths the other costs.This is equivalent to assuming that
two-thirds of total cost is influenced by the increase in weight, and roughly
accords with the weight-price data cited earlier.37 Column 2 of Table 4
presents the index of resource content for locomotives based upon this
weighting scheme. The ratio of materials purchases to value of final
product is not the same for the manufacture of passenger and freight cars,
and so this relationship between weight and resource content will not
hold there.But the same general method can be used, in which all
materials inputs and one-third of other inputs vary with weight, inasmuch
as scattered data affirm declining unit costs for cars as well.38Since
materials were more important in car manufacture, the more nearly
proportional indexes of columns 4 and 6 result.39
To estimate the net stock of equipment in consistent equivalents first
requires conversion of all production flows to the common 1909 denomi-
nator; that is why the indexes of real cost have been put in decadal terms
rather than in those of a single date. This done, the gross stock at each
date is easily reconstructed in 1909 equivalents from the information in
Table 3. To these are applied depreciation rates of 5 per cent for loco-
motives and freight cars, and 4 per cent for passenger cars, following the
useful lives of the various types of equipment developed earlier.The
results are presented in Table 5.
Twoadditional pieces of information are required to transform the
materials already developed into a measure of the net capital stock. The
first is a set of weights to combine the various types of rolling stock;
the second, the weights to aggregate equipment and mileage units. For
both, 1909 prices are used in order to maintain a consistent technology
and price base, but as we shall show, the results are not especially sensitive
to this specification. Let us begin, however, with the capital data in 1909
dollars and technology presented in Table 6.
In both 1890 and 1900, materials outlays absorbed slightly more than one-half the
total costs of locomotive construction, with labor inputs about 40 per cent (Twelfth
Census, 1900, Vol. X, p. 243).
38SeeLavis, Railway Estimates, pp. 423 and 428—429.
Materials were about two-thirds of the value of cars in 1889, 1899, and 1909. So
variable costs of .67 + .3(.33) yields variable costs of .77 (or four-fifths) the change in
weight. The larger fraction (rather than three-fourths) was used, since the very large
range encompassed here would tend to cause convergence to proportionality. For the
materials ratios, see the Twelfth Census, 1900, Special Reports on Manufactures, Vol. X,
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The equipment stock in Table 5hasbeen valued at prices of $11,000
per locomotive, $8,000 per passenger vehicle, and $800 per freight car.
These are derived from corresponding Census valuations of $12,045,
$8,638, and $843 for the year 1909-10, after adjustment for the greater
size of equipment produced in that year than the average for the stock
as a whole. The prices are slightly higher than direct application of the
earlier formulas would indicate in order to allow for delivery and set-up
costs met by the railroads and included in capital outlays.4°
This equipment total for 1909 is an input in the determination of the
1909 price for construction of an average mile of main track.4'This
latter is not observable since in a year of limited construction, concentrated
geographically, the cost per mile of road actually built is not a good
proxy for the national average reproduction cost. What has been done,
therefore, is to subtract this equipment estimate of $1.7 billion from
Ulmer's 1909 total net capital stock estimate and thereby obtain a corre-
sponding aggregate for net road investment alone.This is convertible
into a per mile statistic by division by the earlier series of net 1909 equivalent
main trackage. The resultant unit price of $40,200 is applied to the
quantities in all previous years.
Following so soon after my severe criticism of Ulmer's pre-1909 figures,
this ready acceptance of his 1909 net capital stock estimate may give the
impression of a double standard.There is none. Ulmer's investment
flows beginning with 1912 are derived from the ICC reports, not the
sampling method under attack earlier.Likewise, his post-1914 price
index is also entirely of ICC origin.Finally, his capital stock estimates
throughout are developed by adding his net investment figures to an ICC
benchmark of January 1, 1937. This means that, as long as the constant
dollar investment flows between a given date and January 1, 1937, are
Todetermine the prices for the average equipment stock as of 1909, the prices of
the average increment to the stock in 1909 were divided by the relevant indexes of real
cost. The average weight of the additions to locomotives and freight cars was calcu-
lated by using the ICC information on purchases and retirements, and the weights of
the stock in 1908 and 1909. These gave rise to indexes of 114.8 and 109.1, respectively;
the index of real cost in Table 4 was used for passenger cars in the absence of exact
information. These divided into prices of $12,271 for locomotives, $8,313 for passenger
cars, and $843 for freight cars yield 1909 prices applicable to the 1909 stock of $10,689,
$7,402, and $772. (Note that the 1909 prices used here differ slightly from the Census
values of footnote 32 because they are adjusted for manufacture in railroad repair
shops.) These prices in turn were rounded to the values cited in the text.
41Theexclusion of cars in company service (information on which is not available
continuously) leads to a very small and insignificant bias here because it overstates the
investment in road relative to equipment and these two do not grow in parallel fashion.
How limited this distortion is may be seen from the later comparison between columns
4 and 5ofTable 6,whichare the results of applying two different sets of weights for
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accurate,so is the capital stock estimate. The date 1909 satisfies this
condition; earlier dates do not because the flows are subject to the flaws
detailed before. Beyond this, there is further corroboration from various
attempts by state railroad commissions around 1909 to estimate current
reproduction costs less depreciation of railroads lying within their borders.
In the instance of Nebraska, the 1909 valuation, less cost of right-of-way
and station grounds, was $34,000 per mile. Since the book value of rail-
roads in that state was some 30 per cent below that for the country as a
whole, the implied national valuation of $47,000 per mile of roadway
corresponds quite well with the $44,000 implied by Ulmer's net capital
stock estimate.42 Accordingly, the 1909 Ulmer total can be equated with
mine, a procedure which has the added virtue of allowing a smooth
linkage with Ulmer's subsequent, and reliable, capital stock totals.43
In light of the successive layers of assumption which underlie these
final estimates of the net capital stock, it is essential that there be some
independent checks upon their validity.The cause of the most easily
allayed doubt is the influence of alternative relative prices upon the
movements of the capital stock series. Column 5ofTable 6 presents an
alternative index of total capital based upon a share of equipment in total
investment of 10 per cent, and a 90 per cent share of road.44 The 1909
prices actually used imply constant shares of 16 per cent and 84 .per cent,
which, although representative of the situation at the terminal date,
overstate the role of equipment during much of the period—hence the
relevance of the weighting scheme of Variant II. Note how little difference
the substitution makes. A similar test on the equipment total was per-
formed by substituting relative prices for locomotives, passenger cars, and
freight cars that were more typical of nineteenth century conditions than
42FourthAnnual Report, Nebraska State Railway Commission, 1910-11, pp. 328,
330, and 498. The book value of road and equipment was $42,000 per mile for Nebraska
railroads versus $58,000 for all United States railroads, as calculated from ICC statistics
for 1909.
Hisconstant-dollar estimates can be converted to 1909 dollars by multiplying by
.568, the ratio of the value of his price index in 1909 to that in 1929. Since the ICC
index is based upon 1910—14 weights, the earlier constant dollars are probably more
appropriate in any event.
"This ratio is probably more indicative of the situation during most of the nineteenth
century. See my American Railroads, Table B-4, for the antebellum period, and Ulmer,
Capital.in Transportation, p. 225, citing the ICC, for the latter part of the period.
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where R is the quantity of road, PR its price, E the quantity of equipment, and FE its
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those in 1909 were; the principal difference is the increase in the relative
price of passenger cars by the latter date. Although not shown here, the
two alternatives move in virtually identical fashion. The further force of
these results is the independent validity of the rates of growth of the
capital stock estimates even if the absolute values based on Ulmer's 1909
total are in error.
Beyond this reassurance of relative inconsistency, there are some
measures of absolute reliability as well.Table 7 brings together the
relevant information. The first test compares the antebellum flow and
stock estimates with a set derived by deflating current dollar expenditures
developed from railroad accounts.45 The almost perfect agreement in
the decades of the 1830's and 1840's is heartening. At their worst in the
1850's, moreover, gross capital formation obtained from the present
model is within 20 per cent of the other series, with the corresponding
terminal stocks still closer. In terms of deviation from a long-term trend,
the error is negligible, in sharp contrast to the break in 1869 when the
Ulmer series begins.
A second check involves extension of the method to the decade beyond
1909 when Ulmer's data assume the authority of an official basis. The
last line in Table 7 presents the results. My capital stock projection of
$11,277 million in 1909 dollars falls short of the Ulmer $12,053 million
because of a corresponding underestimate of gross investment.46 That
The conversion from prices of 1860 to those of 1909 was accomplished by sub-
stituting the corresponding 1909 prices of rails, daily wages of unskilled labor, materials,
and locomotives for the 1860 ones. The 1909 locomotive price first was converted to
a 1909 price for an 1860-size locomotive. Actual 1909 and 1860 prices are:rails,
$29.40 and $49.98 per ton; labor, $1.38 and $1.04 per diem; locomotives, $6,710 and
$9,250. The relative materials price of 1.493 was calculated from the Warren and
Pearson and BLS index of wholesale prices of building materials. Sources for the 1909
prices are:rails, Historical Statistics, 1960, p. 123, Ser. E-108, with an allowance of
5 per cent for delivery;labor, ICC Statistics of Railways for 1909, daily wages of
"other trackmen";locomotives, see above;materials, Historical Statistics, 1960,
pp. 115, 117, Ser. E-8 and E-21.
The use of a daily-wage relative avoids overstating the increase in costs between the
two dates, since some of the productivity advance was absorbed in a shorter working
day.This, and a large weight for materials, helps explain the very different index
found by Ulmer (based after 1890 on hourly wage rates).His 1909-1860 relative is
1.75 and would place the pre-Civil War estimates in sharp contradiction.(But the
rate of change within the antebellum period would still agree; at issue only would be
the change from 1858 to 1869, and even with Ulmer's cost index, his 1869 estimate is
out of line.)
46Asfurther evidence of the satisfactory fit of the retirements model in this period,
there are the ratios of predicted to actual equipment purchases during the decade
1910—19: locomotives, 1.056; passenger cars, .953;freight cars, .863.Information
on actual purchases and retirements during the decade may be found in ICC Statistics










VariantIVariant IIVariant IVariantIIVariant IVariant II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1828—38 89.3 88.8 6.6 4.6 82.7 84.2
1839—48 172.2 172.5 24.1 30.0 230.8 226.7
1849—58 926.9 761.2 98.5 114.5 1,059.2 873.4
1859—69 919.9 238.0 1,741.1 3,911.0
1870—79 2,010.4 2,458.0 454.1 843.0 3,297.4 5,526.0
1860—89 4,094.6 3,478.0 918.0 1,271.0 6,474.0 7,733.0
1890—99 2,498.6 2,659.0 1,412.0 1,767.0 7,560.6 8,625.0
1900—09 4,945.8 3,967.0 2,048.5 2,133.0 10,457.9 10,459.0
191U—19 3,554.1 4,414.0 2,784.5 2,820.0 11,227.5 12,053.0
Source
Col.1;Purchases of equipment in 1909 equivalents and change inundepreciated1909
equivalent main trackage times 1909 prices.
Cola. 2, 6, 1828—58:Gross investment in 1860 dollars from TableB—iD (of my
American Railroada) times 108.23.
Cola. 2, 6, 1870—1919:Gross investment in 1929 dollars from Ulmer,aapitaiin
Traneportation, times 56.8.
Cola. 3, 4:Gross capital formation minus changes in net capital stock.
Col. StTable 6, col. 3.
theprocedure should yield such favorable results in that decade with the
smallest increase in mileage of road since the 1860's, and consequently
a much larger expenditure upon betterments than additions, is confirma-
tion of its merit. The shortfall is significant not only because it represents
the anticipated deviation, but also because it reinforces the criticism
earlier made that Ulmer's gross investment estimates before 1910 are too
small.It would require a sharp reversal indeed, and within a single
decade, in the coverage of the road and equipment index to explain the
exactly opposite divergence between Ulmer's investment flow of 1900—09
and my own.
A final test consists of the very magnitude of that divergence over the
longer span 1870—1909.Ulmer's total gross investment is about $1
billion (1909) smaller than mine. Earlier I have contended that the princi-
pal cause of understatement in Ulmer's investment estimates was his neglect
of retirements. Accordingly, total retirements in 1909 equivalents valued
in 1909 prices should approximate this sum. In fact, they do, aggregating
$1.16 billion. Thus the flows in column 1 are at least reasonably correct.
The same judgment applies to the stocks. Although the above difference612 SOURCES OF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
in gross investment explains but half the difference in 1869 stock estimates,
with the remainder due to Ulmer's much higher capital consumption
allowances, the latter are also easily shown to be in error by the appro-
priate amount. What is responsible for Ulmer's excess is not higher
depreciation rates, but rather the understatement of flows in conjunction
with the erroneous 1869 original cost estimate to which attention was
drawn earlier.In the decade 1910—19 when the depreciation base is
identical, the two estimates of capital consumption virtually coincide, and
draw progressively apart only as one moves back in time. That is because
Ulmer calculates his allowances as a percentage of an exaggerated total;
his 1869 original cost is more than one-third too large, and his estimates
for the intervening years to 1909 are likewise too great because they are
interpolated backwards by the inadequate gross flows.If we reduce his
capital consumption allowances by the ratio of the two different estimates
of the capital stock at the beginning of the decade, i.e., substitute a smaller
depreciation base, his total is almost at parity with mine.
The positive fruits of this extended discussion of railroad capital
formation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are a new series
of constant-dollar gross and net investment, by decades, and a corre-
sponding set of net stocks. At the same time there is a negative product.
No longer can we safely rely upon the pre-1910 Ulmer estimates. Thus
there remains the task of providing new annual series, both current and
constant dollar, to fill the gap. Reworking the sample results obtained by
Ulmer from railroad accounts to include retirements represents one
approach, to which must be tied revision of the method of annualization
to make the year-to-year changes consistent with the levels.For trend
analysis, however, the capital stock estimates presented here should suffice
in the interim.
Quantitative Measures of Railroad Development,
1840-1910: Labor
The estimation of labor inputs poses less difficulty than the reconstruction
of the capital stock series.First, employment is a much more straight-
forward magnitude that was measured reasonably accurately at the time.
Thus from 1880 on, there are counts of employment for the whole industry,
and, even from 1850 on, national tallies of an occupational group termed
"railroad men." Secondly, employment is a good measure of labor inputs
because the standard number of hours per week remained constant over
the entire period under investigation. Not until 1917 did the length of the
workweek decline from sixty to forty-eight hours.47 Finally, close relation-
















1870:.592 (the sample regression coefficient) times $388.4 million, the
estimated total receipts in that year derived in developing Table 1.
1880:Tenth Census, 1880, Vol. IV, Agencies of Transportation, adjusted
to reflect corrected Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe report presented in
the note (ibid.,p.13).
1890—1910:Same as Table 1.
principle, the employment figures should be annual averages to
represent accurately labor inputs corresponding to the flow of output.
But until the appearance of the ICC data averaging Counts, these are
estimates of end—of—year totals.
etc.,afford the possibility of estimating industry-wide employment in the
earlier part of the period when it was not directly reported.
Such an approach is preferable to working with the Census of Occupa-
tion totals.These are badly understated because the category "railroad
men" excludes a considerable number of maintenance and shop workers
listed under other titles.In 1880 when industrial and occupational
classifications are presented together for the first time, the ratio of the
occupation to the industry total is .56, and increases to .64 by 1910.48
An upward trend in coverage extends back still further, but is not sufficiently
stable to permit the effective use of the occupation statistics. According
to our independently derived industry estimates, the ratio is as low as .27
in 1850, rising thereafter to .42 in 1860, and .67 in 1870.
These pre-1880 industry estimates, arrayed in Table 8 along with the
Seethe Aldrich Report, S. Rep. 1394, pp. 1365 if., and Leo Wolman, Hours of
Work in American Industry, NBIER. Bulletin 71, New York, 1938. As a consequence,
Kendrick's man-hour and employment series show an almost exactly parallel change
over the period.
These are computed in Daniel Carson, "Changes in the Industrial Composition of
Manpower since the Civil War," Studies in Income and Wealth, 11, New York, NBER,
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later and more reliable Census and ICC reports, have been developed by
extending cross-section relationships between employment and receipts
fit to sample observations in each of the years except 1839. For 1839,
because of the limited information available, application of the 1849
parameter was the only feasible procedure.
We first evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of this method, and then
compare its results with alternative estimates. A minimum criterion that
there should be a significant relationship between employment and
receipts for the sample observations is certainly satisfied by this approach.
In 1849, with thirty-six reporting railroads in Massachusetts and New
York, the share of the variance in employment explained by a single
pooled regression is 89 per cent.In 1859, with a total of sixty-three
observations, and three different regressions for each of the three states
represented, R2 varies from .82 to .99.Finally in 1870, a single pooled
function relating employment to receipts on thirty-six railroads in Ohio
and Massachusetts yields an R2 of
This internal consistency of the relationships is not conclusive evidence
in favor of the technique, however. An equally important requirement
is that the sample relationships derived from these two or three states
be appropriate to all regions of the country. If all railroads in Massachu-
setts in 1849, say, conform closely to the practice of having one employee
per $1,500 of receipts, but southern and western railroads have two for
Receipts are in thousand dollars, employment in units. Thus the coefficients are
to be read as 64 men per $100,000 of receipts, 71 men, etc. The regressions are homo-
geneous in each case, that is, without a constant term, to facilitate aggregation.If
E =a+ bR,=Na+ whereas if E =bR,EE = without the necessity
of specifying the number of railroads in the country. In all instances the constant a
was determined not to be significantly different from zero before the homogeneous
form was fitted.
Only in 1859 were the regressions so distinct that an analysis of covariance test
rejected the hypothesis of a single population. The reason is the extremely large weight
of the New York observations in the total and the very close fIt achieved in that state.
As is pointed out, the coefficients are sufficiently close that the failure of a single
regression to hold does not invalidate either the method or the results.
For 1870 two adjustments were made. The Massachusetts State report covered only
ten months of operation, requiring multiplication of earnings by 6/5 to convert them
to an annual basis. Three Ohio railroads were excluded from the sample, the Central
Ohio, the Sandusky, Mansfield and Newark, and the Marietta and Cincinnati, because
they deviated obviously and radically from their counterparts in the direction of an
excess of employment. This is almost certainly due to part-time employment, for in
the next year, all three railroads exhibited decreases in employment with increases in
receipts.
Exact references to antebellum state reports are to be found in Appendix C of my
American Railroads; for 1870 they are Massachusetts Board of Railroad Commissioners,
Second Annual Report, 1870, and Ohio Commissioner of Railroads and Telegraphs,
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the same volume of earnings, the Massachusetts statistic will do rather
poorly as a projection device. No direct demonstration of the satisfaction
of this condition can be made since it is the lack of complete information
that necessitates estimation in the first place.Nonetheless a blend of a
priori analysis and indirect checks supports the approach.
The selection of receipts as the independent variable for the regressions
carries the promise of greater regional stability than alternative choices
like physical output or operating expenses. By rewriting the equation
10 W 1\ E =bRin the following form, E =I —. — —, R,where E is employ- \R 0 WI
ment,0 operating expenses, W the total wage bill, and w the annual
wage per worker, it is easy to see why. The same parameter b may obtain
in all regions even when there are differences in labor productivity (w),
or profit margins (0/R), or income shares of capital and labor (W/0) as
long as they all move in such a way as to produce a constant or near
constant product. Since greater labor productivity will yield larger shares
in income when substitution possibilities are limited (as in railroad
technology), there are reasons to expect a positive correlation between
w and W/O; at the empirical level, it also seems to be true that high profit
margins coincide with relatively low wages, as in the South, where lack
of railroad competition not only maintained rates but also kept wages
low. Supporting this line of argument is the considerable stability of b
over time, while all three components in its determination varied widely.
Its value is .64 in 1849, .71 in 1859, .59 in The ability to pool
observations, except in 1859, also confirms geographic stability, although
admittedly within a narrow compass; note too that in 1859 the range of
variation in b is limited to the difference between .63 in Ohio and .73 in
New York.Finally, the sample states represent the regions with the
greatest employment so that errors in extrapolation to others are less
crucial. Thus in 1859 the Middle Atlantic and New England regions plus
Ohio account for 60 per cent of national railroad receipts. Suppose that
the coefficient used to determine employment in other regions is as much
as 20 per cent too small, total employment is in error by only 8 per cent.
In earlier years the sample coverage is greater, and it is probably not much
smaller in 1870.
Three less conjectural checks buttress the case.First, there is the 1880
distribution of receipts and employment. Although the very extensive
difference between the lowest and highest ratios of employment to receipts
—.48 in the Far West and .88 in the South Atlantic states—seems to belie
For simplicity here, we have pooled the 1859 Massachusetts, Ohio, and New York
observations, despite the circumstances elaborated in footnote 49.616 SOURCES OF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
the logic developed above, initial appearances are somewhat misleading.
For the three regions with 80 per cent of total employment, the simple
ratios range only from .67 to .76.51 Moreover, because our 1870 sample
states are drawn from two of these regions, a second check that consists
of comparison of 1880 total employment projections using sample Ohio
andMassachusettsrelationships with the known total also comes out
well. An 1880 Ohio sample as small as the 1870 one yields an almost
exact estimate of the true 1880 figure, falling short by less than 1,500 from
the observed 416,300. The Massachusetts coefficient in 1880, however,
is smaller relative to the Ohio one—.63 vs. .71—and so leads to an under-
estimate of about 12 per cent.This is still a creditable performance;
and since the disparity in coefficients did not prevail in 1870. it does not
necessarily imply an equivalently large error earlier.
The last test draws upon new employment and receipts information in
a southern state (Virginia) in 1859 and contrasts the calculated coefficient
there with the statistic estimated from Massachusetts, New York, and
Ohio data. A close relationship holds in Virginia between employment
and receipts, but with a larger coefficient (.82) than the .63 to .73 recorded
in the others.52 A maximum error of about 25 per cent is involved if one
uses the Ohio value to predict Virginia employment, and less than 15
per cent for the pooled .71.If this result holds for the South generally,
the implied total 1859 error is well within the 8 per cent limit discussed
above. .But this is the worst possible representation of the comparison.
If a single Virginia observation is eliminated from the sample, the coeffi-
cient for that state is altered to a much more consistent .70, and virtually
without reduction in R2. To the extent that this single road is indeed
atypical, there apparently need be no concern at all for the application
of the sample regressions to other regions, at least in the early years.
For these reasons, therefore, we can expect the pre-1880 employment
estimates in Table 8 to be accurate measures of railroad employment.53
Stanley Lebergott's estimates in this volume derived by an entirely
different technique—extrapolation of 1880 regional employment-mileage
ratios based on sample ratios—confirm these expectations for the three
antebellum years.54 His 7,000, 21,000, and 82,000 totals are quite compa-
rable to our 5,000, 18,000, and 85,000, and leave little to choose between.
This information is drawn from the TenthCensus, 1880,Vol. IV, pp. 25 and 257.
The source is the Annual Report of the Virginia Board of Public Works for 1858/59.
There are ten observations and the R2 of .82 is significant at the 1 per cent level.
This applies even to the 1839 estimate obtained by using the 1849 parameter
without change.The relativeconstancy of the coefficient over time is the reason for
confidencein this procedure.
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Buthis 1870 estimate of 159,000, even allowing for a slight difference in
timing in our measures, is so far short of our 230,000 to compel comment.
Lebergott's shortfall can be traced to a single region, the Middle Atlantic;
his data indicate a rise of more than 85 per cent in employers per mile
between 1870 and 1880 in that region, while the ratio increases in the rest
of the country only by 13 per cent This inconsistency suggests that the
1870 Middle Atlantic value may be too low, but not necessarily: the rate
of increase in the same regional ratio between 1860 and 1870 (if my 1870
estimated employment is correct) considerably exceeds that of others due
to much greater increases in output per mile of line. To document this
allegation further, therefore, it has been necessary to examine the employee-
mileage ratio in Ohio both in 1868 and in 1880; at the former date, it
stands at 6.10, well above Lebergott's regional value of 3.95,andactually
declines to 6.07 in Both the earlier absolute level as well as the
direction of change are inconsistent with Lebergott's analysis, and this
for a state with 20 per cent of the mileage in the area. The other states
would have to have a much smaller number of employees per mile (3.5)
for the results to be consistent, and this would imply a difference between
Ohio and other Middle Atlantic railroads much greater than that observed
in either earlier or later years.
These technical details are sufficient reason to cast extreme doubt on
Lebergott's 1870 alternative.Another, more general argument is the
inconsistency of the lower employment estimate with the pattern of output
growth.Ton-miles per mile of road increased from about 100,000 in
1859 to more than 270,000 in 1870 and to 370,000 in 1880.56 Yet Lebergott's
employment per mile climbs more rapidly from 1870 to 1880 than from
1860 to 1870. Unless one can explain the almost unparalleled productivity
growth of the decade 1860—70 and the negative movement in the next
ten years, it is best not to rely on the 1870 Lebergott magnitude.
The only other possible comparison also relates to the disputed 1870
figure.But in this instance, our 230,000 is substantially be/owDaniel
Carson's 270,000, which was obtained by scaling up the Census of
Occupations count by the undercoverage observed in later years.57It is
tempting to invoke the virtue of being at neither extreme as further
justification for our 1870 value; but a little reflection should establish
The Ohio data are to be found in the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of
Railroads and Telegraphs for 1867/68 and 1879/80. One reason why Lebergott—who
also used Ohio in his tabulations—may have gone awry is that employment is listed
tor the Ohio portion of the line only, not the total.If total mileage is then used in
the denominator, the number of employees per mile is incorrectly depressed.
According to the estimates presented in Tables 1 and 2.
See Carson's paper in Studies in Income andWealth, 11.618 SOURCESOF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
that a middle-of-the-road position has no intrinsic merit in statistics,
whatever its advantages in politics. Rather, the ground for preferring our
1870 estimate to Carson's is its basis in contemporary sample data, while
Carson's depends upon extrapolation of later nonbehavioral relationships.
There would seem to be little reason why the undercount of the Census
of Occupations in 1870 (a rather questionable Census in many respects)
should be the same as in 1880, whereas there is good and obvious reason
for employment to be related to receipts, and also for a cross-section
extrapolation to yield a close approximation to the correct national total.
The 1880 and subsequent entries require no comment beyond that
already presented in Table 8 itself.
Quantitative Measures of Railroad Development,
1840-1910: Fuel
In principle, an analysis of productivity changes ought to be concerned
with inputs of materials as well as of capital and labor. For reasons of
convenience, however, materials are usually neglected in favor of working
directly with value added.This simplification overstates productivity
change in the typical case and also obscures one important source of
increased output per unit of labor and capital.58 Although this criticism
When technological change is positive, a value-added index (geometric or arith-
metic) will exaggerate the rate of change for a given industry. See IEvsey D. Domar,
"OntheMeasurement of Technological Change," Economic Journal, December 1961,
p. 716, and "On Total Productivity and All That," Journal of Political Economy,
December 1962, P. 603.
Butfrequentlygross output and net inputs are used. This formulation actually may
eliminate the value-added bias, depending upon changes in the relative importance of
materials.I will illustrate with the arithmetic, or total factor productivity, index,
although the argument can also be extended to the geometric index. Let Y be value of
real output in base-period prices; L, K, and R physical inputs of labor, capital, and
raw materials; and w, i, and r their respective prices. Then there are three alternative
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C2 >C1whenC1>1,butC3=C1when v =
that is, when the share of materials in total inputs valued at base-year prices is constant.
If the share declines, C3 will understate C1, and if it increases, C3 > C1, but for certain
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applies with less force to the railroad sector, because of its high value-
added ratio, nevertheless, I have undertaken to include fuel inputs
explicitly among the series.Although not exhaustive of the complete
range of materials necessary to railway operation, fuel does account for
the largest part of current material inputs.59
The inclusion of fuel inputs has the further virtue of highlighting a
significant nineteenth century technological change. Before the Civil War,
despite some preliminary experimentation that began to yield tangible
progress by the 1850's, American locomotives were fired almost exclusively
by wood. Within a score of years thereafter, a transformation so rapid
had occurred that twenty times more coal than wood was being consumed
annually, and more than a fourth of bituminous coal output was regularly
absorbed by the railway sector. The underlying mechanism is almost a
text book illustration of substitution in response to changing relative
prices. To begin with, eastern railroads with large coal deposits along
their lines,.and hence both low coal prices and elastic supply, invested in
research necessary to eliminate the troublesome technical problems that
had limited the development of coal-burning locomotives. Once successful,
the eastern railroads penalized by high wood prices and the western
railroads favored by low coal prices led the parade to mineral fuel. Note
that it was not so much the initially high price of cordwood that motivated
the first research as the prospect of much higher future cordwood prices
due to rapidly growing demand and inelastic supply. But once the break-
through had come, the New England railroads that paid high prices found
it profitable to switch. The last holdouts, naturally enough, were southern
railroads whose scant demands and favorable environment meant continued
low prices for wood.6°
Unfortunately, the pace of this transition, as well as the quantities of
fuel consumed at various dates, is largely unrecorded at the national
level. A single observation on the 1880 volume of cordwood consumption
must suffice until ICC tabulations of coal purchases begin in 1917. All
we can glean from railroad records are accurate reports of total fuel
expenditures (and not before 1880).
Theother large material inputs are those of rails and ties to compensate for
depreciation of capital. To ignore these is to measure outputs gross but inputs net, or,
in terms of footnote 58, to use C3 as our index. Since depreciation actually declined
due to technological changes, C3 will then understate the observed increase in produc-
tivity, but the magnitude of the effect is limited. In 1880 the neglected nonlabor Costs.
and purchases of all additional services amount to about 20 per cent of output, in 1910
to 18 per cent.
60Forfurther discussion of the shift before the Civil War, see my American Railroads,
Chapter III. Appendix D of the 1880 Census of Transportation confirms the concentra-
tion of wood consumption on southern railroads.620 SOURCESOF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
TABLE9
MATERIALS INPUTS, 18L1O_1910
Expenditures Locomotive Cordwood Coal










1839 .4 5.4 .12 ——
1849 1.5 15.9 .35 ——
1859 8.1 81.0 2.0 .3










1900 90.6 1,170.6 —— 588k
1910 217.8 1,714.4 — 128.1
Source
Col. 1, 1839—1859:Estimated operating expenses times 10 per cent in 1839
and 1849 and 12 per cent in 1859.See my AmericanRailroads, AppendixA
and Chapter 3.The proportion expenses accounted for Dy fuel was
estimated by a sampling technique for 1859.
Col. 1, 1870:Estimated operating expenses times 10 per cent.Expenses
werederived from receiptsby applying 1871 operating ratio reported in
Manual.The fuel account proportionfor this period isgiven in
Wellington,Economic Theory,pp.176, 180.
Col. 1, 1880, 1890:Tenth Census, 1880, Vol. IV, and Eleventh Census,
1890, Vol. XI.
Col. 1, 1900, 1910:ICC, Statistics of Railways for 1900, 1910.
Col. 2, 1839, 1849:Terminallocomotive stockb multiplied by 12,000 miles.
The1849 average service is determined by extrapolating the 1859 average
onthe New York average train—miles per locomotive in both years.(The
New York average train—miles per locomotive was the same as the national
average locomotive mileage in 1859.)
b
Col. 2, 1859:Terminal locomotive stocktimes 15,000 miles, the average
service of 1,571 locomotives on twenty—five railroads in 1858.See
AmericanRailroad .Journal, Vol.XXXI,1858,p. 297.
Col. 2, 1870:.6 times $388.4 million; the coefficient was determined
from a random cross—section sample of fifteen roads in 1870 with R2 .82,
and the earnings total is the one discussed in connection with Table 1.
Col. 2, 1880, 1890: Tenth Census, 1880, Vol. IV, and Eleventh Census, 1890,
Vol. XI.Total train mileage in these years includes switching and non—
revenue service and is therefore equivalent to locomotive mileage.
Col. 2, 1900:ICC, Statistics of Railways.Revenue train mileage adjusted
to locomotive mileage by interpolating between the ratios of locomotive
mileage to train mileage in 1890 and 1910; the interpolating series is
the ratio of other track to total mileage, on the grounds that switching
mileage is dependent thereon.
Col. 2, 1910:Statietica of
Cols. 3, 4:See text.
aContains some wood and oil consumption, to a maximum extent of 5 per
cent in fuel equivalents.
bThese terminal stocks differ slightly from the 1838, 1848, and 1858
totals of Table 3.The 1839, 1849, and 1859 values are 450, 1325, and
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There are two alternative approaches to take full advantage of what
few data are available. For the period beginning with 1880 when solid
information on expenditures exists, coal was used almost exclusively.
This means that division of the financial aggregate by an average unit
coal price will yield the relevant physical volume. And, fortunately, for
the one year in which wood loomed largest, 1880, we can separate out
expenditures for it with the help of the Census tabulation of cordwood
consumed by railroads in that year. Earlier, our most reliable knowledge
is of the number of locomotives and the approximate consumption of
wood and coal per mile run. It is not too difficult to convert the locomotive
stock to an annual flow of service performed based on sample data from
railroad reports. Nor is it perilous in the antebellum period to specify
the division between mileage logged by wood and coal burners since, even
in 1859, the latter accounted for a meager proportion of the total. This
method does encounter difficulty with the 1870 estimate due to the uncertain
division between wood and coal in that year. With the further use of
state reports, and some variation upon the technique just described, we
treat that problem in a fashion described below.
Neither of these two methods is mutually exclusive, and although each
has reason to be favored in particular periods, the other is also employed
as a check. Accordingly Table 9 presents in column 1 a complete series
of fuel outlays to serve as the basis of the expenditure approach, and in
column 2 a full complement of locomotive mileages. Generally, the figures
for 1880 on are official, or comparable in quality thereto.Earlier, they
are the product of indirect calculations. For example, the fuel outlays
are estimated as a proportion of operating expenses, which are themselves
obtained from an array of contemporary sources in the same fashion as
the total receipts discussed in connection wit.h Table 1.Similarly, loco-
motive mileage in 1870 is tabulated from earnings, and at earlier dates
from sample accounts of annual services.6'
It is easiest to explain the derivation of the cordwood and coal consump-
tion totals of columns 3 and 4 in chronological order. The antebellum
estimates do not pose great problems despite the lack of any official
benchmarks. Abundant contemporary evidence confirms an average run
of 30 to 40 miles pe.r cord in the later 1850's, a distance that must have
been greater in earlier years as a result of shorter and less frequent freight
"Although 1870 locomotive mileage was determined by a regression technique
utilizing earnings as the independent variable, other data on annual mileage per loco-
motive also support the aggregate reached.The Pennsylvania average in 1870 is
23,000 miles per engine, as calculated from Wellington, Theory, p. 141
(after allowance for switching mileage). Since the Pennsylvania experience was close
to the national average both in 1858 and 1880, this is relevant evidence.622 SOURCES OF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
trains and greater concentration upon passenger accommodation. Fuel
requirements for both 1839 and 1849 are, therefore, pegged at the lower
level of 45 miles per cord.This may be immediately divided into the
state.d locomotive mileage to obtain cordwood consumption for 1839 and
1849 since coal was, for all practical purposes, not used. For 1859, the
intermediate step is necessary of allocating the locomotive mileage between
wood and coal burners due to the first appearance of the latter in any
number. Contemporary discussions suggest that at most 500 coal-burning
locomotives were in use in 1859, and that their total mileage could not
have exceeded 10 million miles with aggregate consumption of 300,000
tons. The residual 71 million miles gives rise to the cordwood entry.62
These inputs, in combination with the corresponding financial magni-
tudes, yield prices of $3.33, $4.29, and $3.60 per cord of wood. Towne
and Rasmussen's prices for comparable years are far lower at $0.84, $1.10,
and $1.60 and imply consumption levels at least twice as high as our
estimates.63 I am not inclined to give this disparity much weight, however.
Towne and Rasmussen's prices are based upon extrapolation of a single
1880 observation on a single series of prices received by Vermont farmers.
In 1880 this average price is itself 20 per cent below a comparable Census
price of wood purchased by railroads, and earlier the divergence seems
to be greater. At the end of the 1850's, all indications point to a price
of over $2.00 per cord for even the most favorably situated railroads,
and the average price for Massachusetts railroads as a whole was $4.46.64
The implied prices, therefore, seem quite reasonable and consistent with
recorded prices, far more so than Towne and Rasmussen's which embody
the dubious assumption that the trends of national scarcity and demand
replicated the Vermont experience.
Cordwood and coal requirements in 1870 are more difficult to gauge.
The distribution between the fuels at this time is quite uncertain although
there are clear indications both of the absolute superiority of coal and a
rapid, continuing tendency in that direction.In Ohio in 1868, wood
burning was still more than twice as prevalent as coal consumption; by
1870 equality prevailed; and by 1872 the proportions had been almost
reversed.Massachusetts railroads in 1871, too, were using more than
twice as much coal, and Illinois roads, due to the accessible bituminous
62MyAmerican Railroads, Chapter III, gives detailed sources and elaborates the
procedure summarized here.
Trends in the American Economy in the Nineteenth Century, Studies in Income and
Wealth 24, Princeton for NBER, 1960, p. 311.
64Theaverage national price in 1880 reported by the Tenth Census (Vol. IX, p. 479)
is $2.21; the corresponding railroad price is $2.60. Also in 1876 the Railroad Gazette
(Vol. III, 1872, p. 114) indicates prices of $3.50 a cord; Towne and Rasmussen,
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depositsin that state, even more.65 If we accept a 2-to-i ratio in favor of
coal in the East in 1870 (as suggested by the Massachusetts experience),
parity in the West (as indicated by the Ohio transition), and zero coal
consumption in the South, we can reach a national ratio by weighting each
region by its relative importance in traffic operations. Such a procedure
points to a 30 per cent disparity in favor of coal consumption in 1870.66
To obtain aggregates of cords of wood and tons of coal, it is necessary
to add information on fuel requirements per locomotive-mile.Here
varied evidence suggests the equivalent of some 60 pounds of coal a mile.
Ohio locomotives in 1861 were apparently using an even greater amount,
69 pounds, and Illinois railroads are found to have used over 80 pounds
in 1872, but these seem to be exaggerated in the light of later observations
in these states and simultaneous Massachusetts use of less than 50 pounds
and consumption of 64 pounds on the Pennsylvania Railroad.67 The
small Massachusetts requirements are natural in view of a passenger
predominance in that state, and the significantly smaller fuel requirements
associated with passenger trains—half as much—whereas it is doubtful
that the national average exceeded the experience of the heavily freight-
oriented Pennsylvania Railroad.
At an input of 60 pounds a mile, aggregate coal-equivalent consump-
tion in 1870 reached a level of 7 million tons. With a national ratio of
coal to cordwood consumption of 1.3 tons to 1 cord, this is translated
into estimates of 4.3 million tons of coal and 3.3 million cords of wood.68
The financial ledgers are quite consistent with this allocation. At prices
65Theseaccounts of consumption are derived from the relevant state reports, except
for the 1870 Ohio observation which is reprinted in Railway Gazette, Vol. II, 1872,
p. 377. For Massachusetts, the average expenditures on wood and coal were converted
to physical units by dividing by prices of $5.50 per cord and $8.00 a ton, prices deter-
mined from prices paid by individual railroads within the state.
66Thatis, with ratios of coal to wood of 2, 1, and 0 and weights of .434, .432, and
.132, we derive the national relationship of= 2(.434)+ 1(.432) + 0(.132) =1.3.
The weights are 1871 regional gross earnings relative to the national total as reported
in Poor's Manual for 1872-73, p. xxviii. (The Pacific region is included in the West.)
67Thesedata are derived from the state reports mentioned earlier. The observation
relating to the Pennsylvania Railroad is found in Wellington, Economic Theory, p. 141.
One reason for the overstatement both in Illinois and Ohio is the tendency of railroads
to err in returning locomotive mileage; gross errors such as substitution of car mileage
are easy to detect and eliminate, but more subtle distortions cannot be rectified.
For the purposes of a coal equivalent consumption total, cordwood is converted to
coal at the rate of 1 cord of wood =.8ton of coal.This is the same factor used in
Sam H. Schurr, Bruce C. Netschert et a!., Energy in the American Economy, Baltimore,
1960, p. 499.
68Algebraically,this converts to the solution of two simultaneous equations. Let
x be million tons of coal consumed, and y million cords of wood. Then
60 x 233 x+.8y=2000 7.0
and x =l.3y.624 SOURCES OF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
of $4.00acord for wood, and $3.00 a ton for coal, drawn from quotations
in the railroad literature, total expenditure is $26.1 million or within
$.9 million of the entry obtained from railroad operating expenses. As
further evidence, one may adduce the vintage of the 1870 locomotive
stock. Almost 60 per cent of the locomotives extent at the beginning of
that year were built during the decade 1859—69. If most were coal burners,
as they probably were, the postulated distribution of coal and wood
consumption in 1870 is to be expected.69 Whatever its shortcomings, such
a picture is undoubtedly closer to reality than the exaggerated claim of
6 million cords of wood consumed by railroads at the end of the 1860's.7°
The publication of accurate fuel expenditures beginning with 1880
signals a corresponding change in estimating technique. Now the task
becomes one of determining accurate coal prices paid by railroads.In
preference to simple extrapolation of the prices actually paid by railroads—
which first became available in 1917—a somewhat more complicated
procedure has been substituted. To the minehead price, we add a variable
transport charge equal to 100 miles of transportation at .8 the average
ton-mile rate in the given year. This formulation has been determined
from the data of the period 1917_25.71 How well it does as far back as
1880 depends upon changes in the average haul for coal and the structure
of rates.Since railroads on the average were closer to coal deposits in
1880 than thereafter, I have altered the specification to assume only
80 miles of transport in that year. Some notion of the maximum error is
given by the largest difference between predicted and actual level of fuel
purchases during the 1917—25 period; it occurred in 1917 when it amounted
Systematic tabulation of the locomotive rosters published in the Bulletin of the
Railway and Locomotive Historical Society would be necessary to establish firmly the
contention that most new locomotives were coal burners. But this is the impression I
have gained from scanning the records. In addition, conversions increased the ranks
of the coal business. Thus the Michigan Central, which increased its locomotive stock
only by two between 1859 and 1869, and retired a few additional units, therefore lagged
in conversion to coal, whereas the Burlington, whose locomotive stock doubled, was
entirely dependent upon coal (ibid., No. 19, pp. 24—25, and No. 91, 127).
Citedby Schurr et a!., Energy in the American Economy, p. 52. "LetQ be tons of fuel consumed, p the price of bituminous per ton at the mine, f
average freight rates per ton-mile, and X fuel expenditures. I have solved the equation
1925 1925
+ mft) = for m, the number of miles coal was transported at the
1917 1917
averagerate.This turns out to be 83.8.Since rates for coal lay below the average
rate, I have interpreted this as 100 miles of transportation at .8 the average rate, an
equivalent formulation.
xx0
Extrapolation can be expressed as —— —
QQopo
Q and X(1917—25) came from the ICC, Statistics of Railways; p andf from Historical
Statistics, 1960, Series M-91 and Q-86, respectively. The same p andf series are used
for the 1880—1910 estimates, except that 1880 freight rates are given in Table 1.THE RAILROAD SECTOR, 1840—1910 625
to 19 per cent; the average absolute deviation is a much lower 5.4 per cent,
however. This is a good deal better than that obtained by extrapolation
of the 1925priceover the same period, when it underestimates aggregate
consumption by more than a tenth and is too small by 28 per cent in 1917.
The reason for the bias is the upward tendency in rates during 1917—25.
Sincethe opposite tendency in rates is observed between 1917 and the
1880—1910 period, simple extrapolation necessarily leads to substantial
overestimates of consumption if applied earlier.
An equally error-prone method is that adopted by H. S. Fleming in
order to derive his estimates of bituminous coal consumption by railroads,
a series which the volume Energy in the American Economy seems to
sanction.72 What he has done is to multiply ton- and passenger-miles by
fuel factors for each. These are roughly constant, and hence make no
allowance for the increasing efficiency of longer trains and less deadweight,
and in addition are set at levels that far exceed what the later data of the
ICC affirm. Not surprisingly then, Fleming's estimates are pegged higher
than those in Table 9 for 1890 and diverge increasingly, to the point where
the 1900 upper bound set by price extrapolation actually falls below
Fleming's figure. Indeed, because he also assumes that railroads not only
used coal exclusively, but also used only bituminous coal, his estimated
consumption of bituminous in 1905 is almost equal to the ICC 1919
bituminous total, despite a doubling of output between the two dates.
Although the disparity with Fleming's series can easily be dismissed,
it nonetheless is useful to check the estimates for 1880 and thereafter
against independent information on coal consumption per locomotive-
mile. The coal equivalent consumption per mile implied by columns 2
and 4 of Table 9 rises from 65 pounds in 1880 to 150 pounds in 1910, a
trend determined by the shift to heavier trains.The early levels are
consistent with Wellington's 1885 fuel requirements of 25—50 pounds for
passenger trains and 75—125 pounds for freight trains, as well as with the
1870 value of 60 pounds used earlier. The later observations accord with
the ICC measured consumption of 166 pounds in 1917 and an informed
1906 estimate of "not less than 90 million tons," which when translated
into requirements per mile comes to 120 pounds.73 Finally, extrapolation
to earlier dates of the 1917 national consumption per mile by the use of
state reports from Kansas, Iowa, and Illinois, encompassing as much as
20 per cent of locomotive mileage, lends additional confirmation to the
72Seethe approving citation on p. 73. Fleming's estimates are found in A Report to
theBituminous Coal Trade Association on the Present and Future of the Bituminous Coal
Trade, NewYork, .1908.
Wellington, EconomicTheory, pp.132 if;ICC, Statisticsof Railways for 1917,
pp.32, 6.1; W. F. M. Goss, "The Utilization of Fuel in Locomotive Practice," U.S.
GeologicalSurvey Bulletin No.402,1909, p.17.626 SOURCES OF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
estimates. The average of the three projections in 1910 is 3 per cent smaller
than the entry in Table 9, within 1 per cent in 1900, and at worst in 1890—
when extrapolation becomes a more dubious tool and only two states are
reporting—8 per cent smaller.If anything, the suggestion is a slight
underestimate, but it is so small as to require no revision.
Output, Input, and Productivity Change
The pattern described by the first eight decades of railway operation, as
we have just derived it,is summarized in Table 10 and Chart 1. The
TABLE 10













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1839 .04 .3 .9 .2 .8 .07 .5 B.7
1849 .31 1.1 2.5 .7 2.2 .2 1.4 22.1
1859 1.7 5.0 11.4 3.6 10.1 1.5 6.6 26.4
1870 6.0 13.5 18.5 6.7 16.6 5.4 13.9 43.4
1880 13.8 24.5 34.2 17.3 31.5 11.7 25.9 53.2
1890 32.8 44.1 66.7 36.6 61.9 28.7 49.3 66.5
1900 54.8 59.9 77.445.2 72.3 45.9 63.2 86.7
1910 100.0 100.0 100.0100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source
Cols. 1—6tTables 1—9.
Col. 7tWeights for employment1 capital, and fuel are .52, .38, and .10. which are
the proportional 1910 shares of the factors as determined from ICC,Statiatiosof
Railwaye for the United State8 for pp. 45, 57, 74, and 76.
Col. 8iOutput divided by total input.
growthof output is no different from that exhibited by many industries
in their initial phases. An extraordinary advance from the small pre-Civil
War base yielded to a still impressive, but much lower, stable rate of
7.3 per cent per annum from 1870 through 1910. This record far exceeded
that of such aggregates as national income or total commodity production.
Over the entire interval 1839—1910, railroad services grew at an annual
rate of 11.6 per cent, with income and commodity output proceeding at a
pace only one-third as rapid.Indeed, no single major sector grew as
rapidly. With an 1870 benchmark, these same observations obtain, albeit
with a somewhat narrowed margin of superiority.Nonetheless, every
single decade saw the railroads as a pace setter.74 There is little reason,
The income and commodity output estimates are the earlier cited ones of Robert
E. Gailman. The sector breakdown of commodity output includes agriculture, manu-
factures, mining, and construction; and services can be approximated as the difference
between income and the comomdity flow.THE RAILROAD SECTOR, 1840—1910
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then, to wonder at the prominent position railroads won in the hearts and
minds of contemporaries.
After World War I, the forces of retardation increased in strength.
Chart 1 tells a tale of continuing deceleration, broken only by episodes of
wartime prosperity. Indeed, the final stage of absolute decline is already
here or very close upon us. The reason is not hard to find. Output growth
before World War I derived considerable impetus from a substantial
geographic extension of the system;it suffices to recall that the 1910
mileage was almost eight times the 1860 level;as a consequence, from
1859 to 1910, geographic extension bears the largest share of the explana-
tion of output growth.Mileage in use increased just about twice as
rapidly as traffic density, and if we credit the lengthening of average haul
to the influence of extension as well, the role of geographic widening in
output growth is 2.2 times that of intensified demand.75
Because the system reached its peak in 1916, this dominant source of
previous expansion gave out by World War I. At the same time railroads
were faced with mounting competition from new forms of transport,
revitalized waterways, and, especially, motor vehicles.Finally, unit
transport requirements may well have declined as the industrial composition
of national income in the twentieth century altered. From virtually .all
sides, therefore, railroads have been subject to retarding tendencies,
against which diversified regional development with a concomitant longer
average haul has stood as a lone and inadequate defense.
This pattern of output changes was duplicated by input trends, with
one crucial exception. Both the stock of capital and employment grew
Railroad output can be decomposed into three factors, tons (and passengers)
originating per mile, number of miles of road, and average distance carried:
0=T/MxMxd.
1910 1910 1910 Therefore,01910/01859 = x x =4.51x 8.62 x 1.16 =45.1.
U1859
Therelative size of the ratios of the components is the basis for the assessment of the
importance of each. Note that the output index of Table 1 gives a slightly larger ratio
of output between the two dates because 1910 weights have been used for this compar-
ison;this probably leads to understatement of the change in average haul, and the
role of extension since it was calculated as a residual. Offsetting this is the use of total
tonnage and passengers carried rather than those originating. Consolidation probably
meant that tonnage originating was a higher proportion of total tonnage at the later
date, and so T1M1910 divided by TIM1859 may underestimate the change in intensity of
demand.
Tonnage and passengers carried are taken from Frickey, Production in U.S., p. 100;
mileage from Table 2; and ton-miles and passenger-miles from Table 1;average
distance was calculated as the residual. 1910 average revenues per passenger and per
ton were used to weight those quantities and 1910 rates for passenger- and ton-miles.THE RAILROAD SECTOR, 1840—1910 629
muchless rapidly, and it is this divergence which gives rise to the impres-
sive productivity advance recorded by the railroad sector. As with output,
the accomplishment in this sphere outstrips that of the economy as a
whole. Between 1839 and 1910, railway output per employee expanded
2.8 per cent annually; Gailman's aggregate product estimates divided by
Le.bergott's labor force totals yields a rate of 1.3 per cent, or less than half
as great.76 A productivity index including capital services enhances the
margin in favor of railroads.In that sector, unlike the economy as a
whole, labor productivity increased in the face of a declining capital-
output ratio, and a total factor productivity comparison therefore pits a
higher railroad rate of growth of 3.5 per cent against an aggregate rate
indeterminately lower than 1.3 per cent.
This disparity is reflected, although inexactly, in a dramatic relative
decline in the price of railroad services. In terms of the bundle of corn-
modities making up Warren and Pearson's wholesale price index, it cost
little more than one-tenth as much to purchase a ton-mile of transportation
in 1910 as in 1839, and about two-fifths as much for a far more comfortable
passenger-mile. Even excluding the very large decline in rates (and increase
in productivity) between 1839 and 1849, real freight rates fell more than
80 per cent from their 1849 level, and real passenger charges 50 per cent.77
The continuation of the data beyond 1910 in Chart 1 reveals a striking
difference between the trends of output and productivity that had so much
in common earlier. Kendrick's data affirm a continuing upward movement
in productivity from 1909 through 1953 at the creditable rate of 2.7 per
cent each year, while output, as we have seen, manages hardly to expand
after 1920. This pace, although below the 3.5 per cent rate maintained
through the nineteenth century, actually exceeds the 1870—1910 rate of
2.2 per cent. Not only is there scant evidence of retardation, therefore,
but there are possible signs of accelerated advance. One distinction
between the earlier and later period is relevant, however. After 1919 the
gains in railway productivity relative to those achieved throughout the
76Theseare found in this volume, and in Stanley Lebergott, Manpower in Economic
Growth,NewYork, 1964, p. 512. Galiman's 1840 and 1909 outputs were divided by
Lebergott's labor force estimates for the same years.
The BLS all-commodity price index stands at 101 in 1909-10, and the Warren-
Pearson continuation of the same at 112 in 1839 (1910—14 =100).Thus the decline
of rates in current prices only slightly overstates its real descent. The indexes are
found in Historical Statistics, 1960, pp. 115—117.
The failure of the real price decline to equal precisely the ratio of sectoral to aggre-
gate productivity is due to inappropriate index number construction and to a more
rapid decline in the price of inputs in the railway sector than in the whole economy.
(See last few pages oF this paper, where we show that the dual of Kendrick's productivity
index is a price index of inputs and output.)630 SOURCESOF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
economy drop off sharply. To this extent, the productivity series mirrors
the same decline in importance of the sector as do the output statistics.
With these trends in mind, we may now turn to the final task before us—
explanation of that impressive nineteenth century productivity advance.
The fundamental factors operating then (and later) may be grouped into
two major categories:improved quality of inputs and economies of
scale. The latter rubric is used to shelter a number of different positive
effects all associated with size, and it will be taken up first.
To begin with, it is useful to make allowance for an effect that is
peculiar to railroads and other related industries. For capital-intensive
and capital durable sectors faced with indivisibilities, the size of the capital
stock is not a good proxy for the annual flow of services it delivers. At
their inception, firms will typically be burdened with higher capital-output
ratios than current demand seems to dictate, due both to technical
considerations and to positive expectations. Only over time will capital
services attain a stable relationship with the magnitude of the stock. As
can be seen in Table 11, the railway industry during its period of geo-
graphic extension is a prime example of what has jUst been described.
From a capital-output ratio of over 70 in 1839, it descends to less than 4
in 1910. The pace of descent varies over time. Periods of rapid extension
of the rail network like the 1850's and the 1880's exhibit much smaller
declines than adjacent decades when increased output is accommodated
by existing road and equipment. Conversely, a period of curtailed con-
struction, coupled with greater demand such as that of the Civil War,
saw dramatic declines.After 1910, as could be expected, the capital-
product ratio moves within relatively narrow limits.
Because the capital stock has been used as an input, part of the measured
productivity gain of railroads recorded in Table 10 derives from this
phenomenon of increasing utilization.Two very crude adjustments
assist in isolating the effect of this special factor. On the one hand, we
may assume that the true production relationship involved capital inputs
exactly proportional to the employment of labor; that is, over time each
worker used no less capital, as the capital stock and employment data of
Table 10 tell us, but actually the same amount. On the other, we may
suppose that the capital-labor ratio actually increased—-as it did for the
economy as a whole—and postulate a constant ratio of capital services
to output. In the former case, total factor productivity converges to the
lesser growth of labor productivity, while in the latter it is further reduced
because the implied increase in capital per worker partially explains the
greater output.
Table 11 computes each of these alternatives. Series I for total factor
productivity results when the capital-output ratio is held constant atTHE RAILROAD SECTOR, 1840—1910 631
its1910 level, while series II reflects a 1910 capital-labor relationship.
The rate of growth of series I is 2.3 per cent annually, while that of II is
a higher 2.9 per cent. Contrasted with the initial 3.5percent, it seems that
secular variation in capital utilization may explain between one-sixth and
one-third of the recorded rate of productivity gain. A constant capital-
output ratio, undoubtedly removes too much of the gain. Such capital
saving innovations as increased motive power per unit of weight, the
higher ratio of load to dead weight in freight cars, and the greater durability
TABLE11
PRODUCTIVITYEFFECT OF INCREASING UTILIZATION
Capital— Capital— Total Factor Total Factor
Output Labor Total Factor Productivity Productivity







1839 73.5 16.6 8.7 20.0 13.3
1849 26.4 12.8 22.1 44.3 31.0
1859 22.2 12.5 26.4 50.0 37.0
1870 10.3 7.6 43.4 61.2 47.2
1880 8.5 7.9 53.2 71.9 59.5
1890 7.0 8.6 66.5 85.6 77.0
1900 4.9 7.4 86.7 96.8 93.7
1910 3.7 6.2 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source
Col. 1*ICC fiscal 1910 receipts of $2,812 million extended back upon output index
of Table 1, and divided by capital estimates of Table 7.
Col. 2:Capital estimates of Table 7 divided by employment estimates of Table 8.
Col. 3:Table 10.
Col. 4:Output divided by newinputindex calculated by weighting employment index
of Table 10 by .52, materials of Table 10 index by .10, and new capital index
(equated to output index) by .38.
Col. 5:Derived like col. 4, except new capital index is equated to employment
index.
ofrails probably superimposed an exogenous downward trend.Dis-
aggregation to the firm level could help in extracting the appropriate
utilization correction. But note that even after a maximum allowance for
this factor, in the shape of series I, the railway sector continues to exceed
the performance of the economy as a whole.
In explaining this still quite large residual, we may invoke more conven-
tional economies of scale. First, there are the familiar increasing returns at
the level of the firm production functions, that is, nonproportionalities asso-
ciated with higher levels of labor and capital inputs (correctly measured).
Another possibility is the traditional Marshallian external economies of
specialization enjoyed as the industry approaches an optimal size; separate
supplying firms may absorb tasks formerly carried out in the industry less
efficiently, for example. A third mechanism ties firm size to productivity632 SOURCES OF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
increases via technological progress.Edwin Mansfield's important re-
search has suggested that large firms typically have been the most
aggressive innovators and also the most rapid followers (the latter point
is less well established).78 There is a corresponding industry analogue in
technological and production effects, as has been demonstrated by Jacob
Schmookler's results relating inventive activity to the size and growth of
industries.79
Historically, all four of these linkages probably operated at various
times in the nineteenth century evolution of the railway sector.Firm
size certainly increased quite significantly.Between 1860 and 1880, as
output rose more than sevenfold, the number of firms increased by a
modest 50 per cent. As a result, the average output of an 1880 firm was
five times that of an 1860 firm. From 1880 to 1910, further intensification
of demand and, more significant, financial consolidation led to another
quadrupling.80 Any nonproportionalities inherent in railroad production
conditions—and their size is a subject for further research—thus had
abundant scope for exploitation.So did the technological effects, but
here there is positive evidence of their existence.Of five important
innovations (as measured by frequent citation in discussions of railroad
technological change)—the use of the telegraph to control train movements
(1851), the substitution of steel rails for iron (1862), the development of
block signaling (1863), the adoption of air brakes (1869), and the employ-
ment of automatic couplers (1873)—four can be traced unequivocally to
major roads, and one is uncertain.8' A larger sample of innovations that
78SeeMansfield's paper, "Innovation and Technical Change in the Railroad
Industry," in Transportation Economics, Special Conference 17, New York, NBER,
1965.
70JacobSchmookler, "Economic Sources of Inventive Activity," Journal of Economic
History, March 1962, pp. 1—20, and other sources cited there.
80estimate the number of railroads in 1860 at between 400 and 500, based upon
the partial count made by the Treasury Department in 1856. The 1880 Census enumer-
ates 631 corporations, and ICC Statistics of Railways gives 926, 1224, and 1306 for
1890, 1900, and 1910, respectively.
81am indebted to Jacob Schmookler for making available a chronology of inven-
tions in the railroad industry. This facilitated the identification of specific innovators.
The Erie Railroad introduced telegraphic communication;the Pennsylvania, steel
rails, after Edgar Thomson had viewed them abroad, and also the automatic coupler;
the Camden and Amboy pioneered with block signaling, again an original English
innovation. There is some mystery surrounding the air brake. An American Railroad
Journal reprint credits the Boston and Providence and Eastern with first use, but other
indications point to the Baltimore and Ohio as the earliest.
The following sources (in the order of the innovations) were accepted: Railway Age,
Vol. 141, 1956, p. 285; Twentieth Annual Report of the Pennsylvania Railroad, 1867,
p. 25; Railway Gazette, Vol. XXXII, 1900, p. 506; Stewart H. Holbrook, The Story
of American Railroads, New York, 1947, p. 290; Railway Age, Vol. 141, 1956, p. 259;
American Railroad Journal, Vol. XLVI, 1873, p. 776.THE RAILROAD SECTOR, 1840—1910 633
include less dramatic but perhaps equally significant changes probably
would show as much concentration on large lines increasingly staffed with
skilled personnel.82
Expansion of demand naturally contributed to increased firm size.It
also led to external economies and induced technical progress on its own.
Thus, as railroads grew in importance, production of rolling stock was
more and more consigned to specialty firms that had evolved from a
previous general machinery orientation.Similarly, a class of rail mills
emerged from what had been manufacturers of the whole gamut of rolled
products. Other examples, including all the special commodities used in
railway operation, could be cited. As to the potential feedback to tech-
nology associated with increased levels of output, no one who has even
casually studied the industry can fail to be impressed by the volume of
literature that disseminated and critically evaluated new ideas. Formal
associations and committees also blossomed. Standardiza-
tion was one result.In the instance of rails, there were 119 patterns of
twenty-seven different, weights produced in 1881;within a few years
after an 1893 report by a special committee of the American Society of
Civil Engineers, three-fourths of the rails were of the standard ASCE
sections 83If flow of information is essential to technological
progress, the conditions in the large railway industry of the late nineteenth
century tended toward the optimaL.
The exact contribution and timing of these effects require much addi-
tional study. What may well be the most promising approach is• a limited
assault upon specifics. For example, how much more would it have cost
to produce car wheels directly in railroad repair shops rather than in
specialized firms? At what size industry were maximum economies reaped?
Or, how much more slowly or rapidly would an industry of smaller or
larger firms have introduced steel rails than was actually done? 1880
Ohio cross-section data show a significant positive correlation between
firm size and adoption of steel rails, with unitary elasticity of response.84
Given the very much greater increase in adoption of steel rails than
82Greatertechnical sophistication also occasionally has its costs. Charles B. Dudley,
Ph.D., chemist for the Pennsylvania Railroad, and hence commanding wide respect,
persuasively advocated low-carbon, or soft, steel rails in the 1870's. The error was not
corrected until ten years later when breakage soared under the ever heavier motive
power.William H. Sellew, SteelRails, NewYork, 1912, p. 13; Railway Gazette,
Vol. XXII, 1890, pp. 702 if.
See the discussion of the development of rails in the United States by Robert
W. Hunt in Railway Gazette, Vol. XXXII, 1900, pp. 505—507 and 522—523.
The data for this regression come from the 1880 Census. R2 =.56with twenty-
six observations so the relationship is significant.Size is measured here by total
receipts, not assets, it should be noted.634 SOURCES OF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
indicated by changes in size, this hardly casts size in a crucial role. The
subject awaits fuller treatment, however. The typical analysis of industry
production functions cannot supply answers to such questions;and
most of the answers it can provide actually confound the individual
mechanisms distinguished here.
It is precisely in this modest spirit that I wish to go on to examine the
impact of quality changes in capital—or technological progress—upon
recorded productivity advance.85 The object is to measure the absolute
and relative importance of four significant innovations introduced in the
latter half of the nineteenth century, namely, steel rails, increased equip-
ment capacity, air brakes, and automatic couplers. Typically their contri-
bution is assumed to be both large and uniform: "The...increasesin
efficiency brought by...ahost of other technical advances permitted
lower railroad rates.The use of steel rails, the adoption of standard
gauge, the utilization of faster and more powerful locomotives pulling
longer and heavier trains, the introduction of standard time, better brakes,
and improved couplers all helped to create a truly national rail network." 86
Yet preliminary study suggests that these innovations varied substantially
in significance and also only partially explain the total productivity gains
achieved at the end of the nineteenth century.
As evidence of the extent of variation among the innovations, there is
first the differential rapidity of their diffusion.Neither air brakes nor
couplers were greeted with much enthusiasm. Although first used in 1869
and 1873, respectively, and despite the designation of a standard form of
coupler by 1887 and the definitive proof of the Westinghouse brake in the
third Burlington trial in the same year, it finally required national legisla-
tion to secure their adoption.In 1890, although almost all passenger
locomotives and cars had been fitted with brakes, not many more than
half of the freight locomotives and less than one-tenth of the cars used
the appliance. Couplers had attained still lesser acceptance: only 3 per
cent of locomotives and 10 per cent of cars (but almost all passenger cars)
were so equipped. The low marginal rate of adoption at that time quite
justifies the conclusion of the statistician of the Interstate Commerce
Commission that the railroad "claim that the adoption of uniform safety
We do not examine quality changes of labor in this paper. This is not because
they did not apply. On the contrary, the railroads were quite interested in industrial
education. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad even set up a special comprehensive
training program for employees in 1885 (W. T. Barnard, Report on Technical Education,
Baltimore, 1887). To deal adequately with the subject here would overburden the
already sorely taxed patience of the reader.I hope to publish some findings on this
subject elsewhere in the near future.
John F. Stover, American Railroads, Chicago, 1961, pp. 143—144.THE RAILROAD SECTOR, 1840—1910 635
devicesis progressing with satisfactory rapidity is not supported by the
facts." 87Congressacted in 1893, requiring both appliances to be installed
on equipment used in interstate commerce before January 1, 1898, a
deadline later extended to August 1900. Compliance followed, and the
beginning of the twentieth century saw air brakes and automatic couplers
as standard equipment, although it took almost another decade for them
to become universal.
This diffidence can be contrasted with the reception afforded steel
rails.Although steel rails commanded a substantial premium in price
over the iron variety, by 1880, less than twenty years after their first use
on the Pennsylvania Railroad, almost 30 per cent of the nation's trackage
was so equipped. By 1890, 80 per cent of track mileage consisted of steel
rails.88 In the single decade 1871 to 1880, the investment in steel rails—
measured as the price differential multiplied by consumption—totaled
more than $80 million. Not only was such a sum commensurate with the
extra absolute cost of the safety appliances installed twenty years later,
but it was much larger relative to the smaller railroad assets of the time.
The assimilation of successive improved designs of locomotives and
freight cars likewise proceeded without external pressures. Its cumulative
character and the lack of a single impressive innovation should not
obscure its rapidity. Within the space of some forty years—from 1870 to
1910—freight-car capacity more than trebled. The remarkable feature of
the transition was its apparent small cost; capacity increased with only
a very modest increase in dead weight, the ratio changing from 1: 1 to
2: 1.Over the same interval, locomotive force more than doubled as
powerful engine types, such as the Mogul, the Consolidation, etc., replaced
the familiar and faithful American 4-4-0.
Either railway decision-makers were irrationalintheir apparent
hesitancy to adopt air brakes and automatic couplers, or their economic
value relative to steel rails and improved equipment was markedly smaller.
Both qualitative evidence and some crude calculations support the latter
inference. In the first place, the properties of the innovations were well
known, which rules out ignorance as a factor in the delay. Nor can
undue weight be given to the claim that lack of uniformity of design
87ICC,Statistics of Railways for 1891, P. 45. The railroad opposition to legislation
was contradictory. One group argued that the new techniques were unproven; another
that railroads were moving ahead as rapidly as possible.Cf. U.S. Senate Interstate
Commerce Committee, Hearings in Relation to Safety Couplers and Power Brakes in
Cars, 51st Congress, 1st Sess., 1890.
88Poor'sManual for 1891, p. xxi. The 1880 Census records a slightly higher per-
centage in that year, namely 35 per cent, but its result may be based upon an un-
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compelled caution on the part of individual railroads in outfitting them-
selves. Many systems were large enough that interchange of equipment
was not an overriding concern. Moreover, the ultimate Congressional
legislation specified no single type, but allowed the choice to emerge from
within the industry.Finally, there is the unmistakable emphasis on
safety considerations in the debate about brakes and couplers. Proponents
before Congress spoke of savings in terms of human lives, not operating
expenses. On at least two occasions when the question was directly put,
there were no assurances of reduced personnel requirements attendant
upon the innovations; otherwise, the various railroad labor organizations
might have been less whole-hearted in their support.89 Twenty years later
an air-brake engineer commented upon the same tendency of railroad
men to emphasize the safety features of the appliances.90 Perhaps they
were justified: in Europe, where adoption was not compulsory, diffusion
was notably slow; and in the United States, prior to compulsion, only
the western lines with steep grades felt that the potential economies of
train brakes outweighed their cost.9'
Calculation of the cost savings realized in 1910 from these four innova-
tions- seems to support the minor economic contribution of the air brake
and automatic coupler.The principal advantage afforded by these
devices was increased speed. Although longer trains were also claimed
to depend upon them, there seems to be little .direct relationship. Auto-
matic couplers were not notably stronger, and it was possible without
great hazard to extend the number of cars in the absence of air brakes
simply by adding more trainmen. That a trend toward heavier freight
trains was under way well before these appliances were installed is proof
of the virtual independence of these developments.92 Greater speed in
itself is not an unmixed blessing, however. Unless engine capacity is not
being fully utilized, higher speeds can be attained only by the sacrifice of
load. What the air brake and coupler really did, therefore, was to allow
a greater element of choice in train operation, permitting higher speed
when it was more desirable than larger loads. But exactly because its
U.S. Senate ICC, Hearings, 1890, p. 53, and ibid., 1892, p. 55.
W. V. Turner and S. W. Dudley, Development of Air Brakes for Railroads,
Pittsburgh, 1909, p. 6.
Forthe concentration of brake installation upon the four major western rail-
roads—the Union Pacific, the Southern Pacific, the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe,
and the Northern Pacific—see ICC, Annual Report for 1889, Appendix 10.
92Itis, of course, probable that the great increase in train size and load after 1910
may have required prior advance in the design of couplers and brakes. A longer time
horizon, therefore, might alter the relative economic significance of the innovations.
(Note, however, that the absolute importance of other changes also increased at the
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influencemanifested itself in this literally marginal fashion, the size of the
economies was limited.
The two positive features of greater speed are reduced capital costs,
through increased utilization of the rolling stock, and smaller train wages,
through fewer hours of travel time. On the other side are increased
repairs to equipment and roadway at higher speeds of operation, as well
as larger fuel expenses. Quantitatively, the economies are circumscribed
because so much rolling stock time in transit is spent off the road—in
loading, redirection in yards, repair, etc.—and because train wages are
relatively small.If later experience is any guide, and scattered late
nineteenth century evidence affirms that it is, a 100 per cent increase in
speed could have made possible a less than 10 per cent reduction in the
number of.freight cars.93 Likewise, with train wages accounting for some
12 per cent of operating expenses, the same radical change in speed could
have led to a saving in total outlay of only 6 per cent. Against these must
be reckoned the diseconomies of speed, moreover. Fuel outlays were
widely regarded as increasing more than proportionally with speed, and
the fuel account is almost 10 per cent of expenses. Rail replacement and
equipment repair also may have been adversely affected.Indeed the
principal discussions of speed in the technical literature relate to its
disadvantages rather than its virtues.94
To ascertain the absolute sum saved in 1910 by the more nearly optimal
speed made possible by the air brake and automatic coupler, we have
to specify how far from the actual circumstances a hand brake and link-
and-pin-coupler regime would have been. Evidence on this point suggests
a very small divergence.Freight and passenger train speeds in 1910
hardly differ from those recorded twenty years before.95 But because
trains were much heavier at the later date, let us suppose that attained
speed, both freight and passenger, would have been one-third smaller
°3Areport by the Federal Coordinator of Transportation in 1935 reveals that
freight-car time in trains was responsible for only 16 per cent of total time (cited in
James C. Nelson, Railroad Transportation and Public Policy, Washington, 1959, p. 266).
A discussion of car utilization in Railroad Gazette (Vol. XLII, 1907, p. 200)affirmsthe
same low proportion at that earlier date.
Cf.the extended comments running through Railroad Gazette, Vol. XXXII,
1900. The most favorable report was an increase in speed of 30 per cent with only a
20—25 per cent increase in costs (ibid., p. 215).
The Pennsylvania State Railroad Report for 1888 lists average freight-train speeds,
including stops, as ranging from 12 to 18 miles per hour. The New York 1885 report
records similar responses. The average speed in 1920 was 10.3 miles per hour (Julius
H. Parmalee, The Modern Railway, New York, 1940, p. 210). Since the latter is based
on actual performance, it is not surprising to find it somewhat smaller than the earlier
cited speeds. We can safely infer rough equality at the two dates. The same approxi-
mate parity holds for speed of passenger trains.638 SOURCES OF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
without the benefit of the safety appliances. On this generous basis, the
rolling stock required would have been about 3 per cent larger than it
was;since equipment was roughly equal to 20 per cent of the total
capital stock, and returns to capital were $821.9 million, the added expense
would have come to $4.9 million. Increased train wages of $113.7 million
augment this, from which we deduct fuel savings of $42 million, to reach
a final tally of $77 million.96 In sum, railroad rates would have been
about 3 per cent greater in 1910 to compensate for the inefficiencies of the
older technology.
An additional contribution of speed is a reduction in transit time and
hence smaller inventories.Also there are the direct safety gains to be
dealt with. Neither factor influences the previous total greatly. Delivery
time is reduced only 3 per cent because freight-car train time is such a
small proportion of elapsed time. The average reduction in working
capital involved is an insignificant $40 million, even if the railroads are
assumed to have transported the entire value of gross national product.97
At an interest rate of 6 per cent, this is a negligible gain of $2.4 million.
As far as safety is concerned, the 1910 losses were a higher proportion
of operating expenses than in either 1880 or 1890.It is conceivable that
the absence of safety appliances could have forced the percentage up even
higher, but it is equally possible that a reduced pace of operations, such as
we have necessarily hypothesized, may have reduced it to its previous
level. In any event, the 1910 total loss is only $50 million, so an increment
on either side is safely neglected.
Granting the crudeness of these calculations, it is still difficult to see
how the state of affairs envisaged by a railroad spokesman in 1912 could
have prevailed:"It may safely be said...thatif we were dependent,
Increased train wages are one-half of actual 1910 train wages of $227.4 million,
or $113.7 million (since the hypothetical hours worked are 50 per cent greater than the
actual ones). Reduced fuel outlays are less than one-third of actual expenses of $189.0
million, however, to compensate for tIxed consumption independent of running speed.
It is assumed that two-thirds of consumption is related to speed, and hence the figure
in the text is 2/9 x $189.0 million (since speed and associated fuel outlays are assumed
to vary proportionally).
°7GNPin 1910 was approximately $30 billion. Even if the value of railroad freight
was this large, this is equivalent to a daily transport of about $90 million. The average
length of trip was fifteen days, tying up $1350 million of capital. A speed one-third
greater could have reduced delivery time to a little more than fourteen and a half
days, or reduced required working capital by $40 million.
Later indications (1936) are that the aggregate value of goods transported by rail is
something like twelve times the freight payment. This would make the actual value of
freight in 1910 less than $25 billion, and reduce the saving even more.
See L. F. Loree, Railroad Transportation, New York, 1926, pp. 264 if., for an
analysis of 1910 freight-car trip time, and Parmalee, Modern Railway, p. 236, for the
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for one day, on the brakes of 20 years ago, the business of the country
would be practically paralyzed, and the loss of both life and property
very great." 98Thefact of technological advance is not synonomous with
its indispensability.
In contrast to these results stand the estimates of the saving attributable
to a steel-railed 1910 track in place of one of iron.Steel rails influenced
railway operations in two respects: first, and most obviously, they wore
much longer;second, and perhaps more important, they bore much
heavier loads without breakage.Both technical advantages were of
economic significance.
The durability of iron rails in the 1870's was variously placed between
4 and 15 million tons of traffic, although the Lehigh Valley reported
tonnages as small as 1.5 and 2.3 million on two different stretches of
road.99 The total traffic in 1910, including the weight of rolling stock,
amounted to some 830 billion ton-miles;the average total tonnage
passing over each mile is estimated by dividing this sum by the number of
miles of track in the system—35l,767. The resultant figure, 2.4 million
tons, divided into a modal durability of iron rails of 8 million tons, say,
means an average life under 1910 conditions of 3.3 years. To put it
another way, 30 per cent of the track mileage in 1910, or 105,530 miles,
would have required replacement in that year.Expense for the 12.1
million tons of rails, allowing for the scrap of the worn-out rails, then
would have come to almost $200 million.'00Actual 1910 outlays for
rails were less than $17 million.Steel rails, therefore, wore more than
ten times as well as iron would have. Such a ratio agrees with independent
engineering assessments placing the life of steel rails at from 100 to 250
million tons, against the earlier cited range of 4 to 15 million tons for iron
rails.'0'
From this aspect alone, steel rails were almost three times as important
as the air brake and automatic coupler. To the differential materials
Journalof the Franklin Institute, Vol. 173, 1912, p. 35. Appropriately enough, the
author was also arguing against the virtue of scientific management a la Taylor.
°°SeeTransactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers, Vol. 111, 1870, p. 104;
C. P. Sandberg, "The Manufacture and Wear of Rails," in Minutes of Proceedings of
the Institution of Civil Engineers, Vol. 27, 1867/68, p. 325; Railroad Gazette, Vol. II,
1870, p. 243; ibid., Vol. III, 1871, p. 510.
100Theaverage weight of rails per mile in 1910 as cited in Table 2 is 115 gross tons.
The wholesale price of rails in that year, as in other years after the formation of U.S.
Steel, was $28. With the addition of delivery charges to make the retail price close to
$30 and a $14 or 50 per cent scrap allowance, the net charge becomes equal to $16
per ton.
Camp, Notes on Track, pp. 97—98. The variety of experimental evidence cited
there points to an average of 140 million tons; the implied 1910 average is just about
100 million tons, which is of the same general magnitude.640 SOURCES OF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
cost, moreover, must be added the increased labor inputs associated with
more frequent replacement. Although accurate information on the labor
cost of rail renewal is difficult to obtain, various technical sources point
to a coefficient of between 50 and 100 man-days per mile of replacement.
At 1910 daily wage rates of $1.50 for trackmen, the aggregate cost of
relaying 105,000 miles of track is $11.8 million, and the differential $10.8
million.102
The second-order effect of greater strength considerably extends the
economic consequences of greater durability.Nonhomogeneous iron
rails were limited in the locomotive weight they could bear. Under heavy
loads they were subject to lamination and crushing. Steel sections, on the
other hand, wore evenly. Consequently it is impossible to maintain that
1910 engines could have been accommodated by iron rails: the maximum
engine weight capable of being borne by eighty-pound track would have
been closer to fifty tons, and quite below the seventy-ton average loco-
motives actually upon the scene.'°3 Smaller engines, in turn, would have
meant more frequent trains. The simplest case is one in which we assume
that total tonnage, load factors, direction of traffic, etc., were unchanged.
Then required freight-train mileage—passenger trains would have remained
almost unaffected—would have been 40 per cent greater, i.e., the ratio
of the seventy-ton average weight in 1910 to the fifty-ton maximum
(and average) that would have prevailed. Under these conditions, and
accepting Wellington's computations indicating a .5 ratio of marginal cost
per train-mile to average cost, the incremental outlay in 1910 comes to
$279 million.104
102Thepractical literature gives a rather varied set of figures that extends from less
than 30 man-days per mile of replacement to more than 100. The 75 man-days actually
used is not likely to introduce a very great absolute error. For discussions of labor
requirements, see ibid., pp. 563—565; E. E. Tratman, Railway Track and Track Work,
New York, 1901, pp. 335—340.
ofSandberg's StandardRail Sections, London, 1872, Table 1; Trans-
actions of the American Society of Civil Engineers, Vol. III, 1870, p. 113;Sellew,
Steel Rails, p. 13.
104Wellington,Economic Theory, p. 571. An allowance for interest on the increased
stock of required locomotives is included in the determination of the ratio.
Freight expenses are not broken down separately in 1910, and they have been esti-
mated using the 1916 proportion, when the ratio between ton- and passenger-miles is
virtually identical to that in 1910. The imputed freight expenses on this basis are
almost $1.4 billion, of a total of $1.8 billion.
There are two offsetting biases in this simplified calculation that should be mentioned.
More frequent, but smaller, trains might have permitted more efficient loading and
reduced the proportion of empty to full cars per train; on the other hand, the compari-
son of the 1910 average weight of locomotives with the hypothetical maximum makes
no allowance for the fact that the 1910 hypothetical average would have been some-
what smaller, and so increased the divergence under the two alternative technologies.THE RAILROAD SECTOR, 1840—1910 641
Inall, therefore, steel rails directly and indirectly saved something like
$479 million in 1910. How much do the increase in freight-car capacity
and the autonomous increase in locomotive tractive power from 1870 to
1910—which grew by more than the difference between iron and steel
rails can explain—add to this total? With the same kind of simplification
just resorted to, we can approximate the answers. The total increase of
average locomotive tractive power between 1870 and 1910 was more than
100 per cent. The calculation of savings due to steel rails has subsumed
less than half of this change. At least double the actual number of 1910
trains would have been required under conditions of 1870 motive power.
Beyond the $279 million reckoned above, therefore, there is another
$420 million in outlay that improved locomotive design obviated.
Had the powerful twentieth century engines been developed without
that simultaneous remarkable advance in freight-car construction, much
more of the increased power would have been dissipated in the non-
productive task of hauling dead weight. A higher ratio of dead weight
requires either more or heavier trains to deliver the same payload, both
involving additional expense. If 1910 tonnage had to be moved in 1870
freight cars, it would have required about 3.3 of them to equal one 1910
car, and at twice the weight. With identical load factors under both
technologies, the same loads would have been carried in four trains of
identical weight (but with 3.3 times as many cars) as were actually trans-
ported in three. Making the simplifying, and savings minimizing, assump-
tion that trains of so many more cars but equal weight could be operated
at the same cost, we still reach the substantial additional expense of
$329 million.'05 These important savings credited here to modern equip-
ment reflect the observed secular association of increased loads per train
and railroad productivity growth.
To recapitulate, our computations indicate that the incremental expenses
incident upon meeting 1910 railroad demands with an 1870 technology
of iron rails, light engines, low-capacity freight cars, hand brakes, and
manual couplers would have amounted to about $1.3 billion. This is not
likely to be much of an exaggeration. The estimate does not suffer from
105Operatingexpenses for the one-third increase in train mileage, using the same .5
relationshipbetween marginal and average train-mile costs as before, total $233
million; interest in catpital outlays for the tripled number of smaller freight cars comes
to a further 896 million since each smaller freight car would have cost about two-thirds
of the actual 1910 price. The aggregate capital outlay required is, therefore, equal to
twice the valuation of the 1910 freight-car stock, or $3.2 billion.Interest on the differ-
ential $1.6 billion, at 6 per cent, is $96 million.
Once more, there is a possibility that smaller cars, more efficiently loaded, could
have compensated. But the explicit American choice of large, capacious cars, with an
attendant lower load factor seems to suggest that such economies were limited.642 SOURCES OF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
the usual substantial upward bias associated with requiring an older
technology to meet later demands, because in this instance exactly the
same bill of goods was not imposed. Trains were not required to go
as fast as they did in 1910; only the direct costs of a slower pace were
reckoned. Equally heavy trains with a tremendous toll upon iron rail
wear were eschewed in favor of the feasible alternative of lighter ones.
Thus, one element of sUbstitution enters the calculations, although not
the response of demand for railroad output to its inevitably higher price.
At every stage, moreover, assumptions that mildly understated savings
were introduced.
This $1.3 billion is an impressive total against the backdrop of 1910
railway operations. To compensate, revenues in that year would have had
to be more than 40 per cent greater. The question remains, however, as
to the importance of this saving in the continual cost reduction—i.e.,
productivity advance—that railroads had been enjoying. These innova-
tions, after all, were not the product of a single decade, or even two.
Their effects were transmitted over some forty years, and by 1910 they
had fully worked themselves out. It is misleading to limit the comparison
to a single year; the entire range of years from 1870 to 1910 must be
included.
In embarking upon such a task, it is useful first to reinterpret our
previous total factor productivity measurements and to show how they
relate to the foregoing analysis of technological change. An index of
total factor productivity, TFP, is the ratio of an index of output to a
weighted index of inputs, where the weights are the base-period income
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Xrepresents output; L, K, and R stand for inputs of labor, capital, and
raw materials; P is the unit price of output, and w, 1, and r are factor
prices; the subscripts 0 and t refer to the base period and the period of
comparison, respectively.
Now, eq. (1) can be rewritten simply as the ratio of the value of output
in base-period prices to the value of inputs in base-period prices:
TFP
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Itfollows from (2) that Kendrick's measure of technological change is
nothing more than the ratio of an index of input prices to one of output
prices. When output prices fall relative to input prices, technological
change has occurred, and vice versa. For eq. (2) divided by numerator







when the final numerator and denominator are seen to be indexes of input
and output prices, respectively.'06
This result recasts productivity analysis in a value frame of reference
similar to one that has been used here to evaluate the specific innovations.
Explicitly, we have computed the cost of producing output in the
base year (1910) using the technology of another year t (1870). This can
be expressed as /
t t I t .t (4)
\'tt
thatis, the hypothetical cost is equal to the volume of 1910 output, X0,
multiplied by 1870 unit input requirements, etc.,valued in 1910




whence, from eq. (3), we reach the desired equation
= (6)
The index of total factor productivity is, therefore, nothing more than the
ratio of the actual price of output in the base year to the price that would
106Iam grateful to Dorothy Brady for suggesting this price index variation to my
original proof. It is useful since it points up the omnipresent duality between price and
quantity results in a competitive equilibrium framework. The simplicity of this dual
relationship for the Kendrick arithmetic index is a virtue that has gone unnoticed.It
helps to offset the valid criticism of its unconvincing production implications. Because
both geometric and arithmetic indexes give similar results over reasonable ranges, the
practical advantages of the Kendrick index are enhanced by the ease of its alternative
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have prevailed in the absence of change in the technological coefficients.
P0 =if the matrix of technical coefficients, LIX, K/X, and R/X, remains
constant; P0 >if the technology attis superior, and P0 if
technology at t is inferior. In the case at hand, because I precedes the base
period in time, less than one, as it is, constitutes progress between
the two dates.
It is now possible to measure the significance of the selected innovations
relative to all influences operative on productivity advance. Thethat
emerges from the previous cost calculations is partial, encompassing only
the effects of the four innovations. Consequently the ratio of this limited
to the totalis an index of their explanatory power. There are three
alternative Ph's to choose among, the highest one corresponding to the
original productivity calculations and the other lower two reflecting the
alternative capacity utilization adjustments made earlier. The respective p't_p
ratios
—
are.36, .42, and Roughly,therefore, the technical
changes dealt with account for half the productivity gains registered in
the railway sector between 1870 and 1910.108
From the standpoint of the limited variety of changes taken up, this
accomplishment is no mean achievement. From another aspect, however,
it is a rather small contribution compared with what might have been
anticipated. The two innovations of greater engine power and freight-car
capacity include a host of lesser changes that are reflected in the final
result: increased steam pressure, substitution of steel trucks, etc. Thus,
the cost reductions made possible by these two advances sum up much
of the residual technical change that occurred;it is not surprising that
they make up almost two-thirds of the $1.3 billion estimate. The fact
that, despite this, only half the productivity change from 1870 to 1910
can be accounted for shows how thick is the veil of ignorance surrounding
the causes of the rapid increases that advanced economies have experienced
in output per unit of input.
107 What is termed the total P0' is, of course, the actual 1910 price divided by the
productivity index.It is easiest to work in 1910 relatives throughout, however, which
then makes simply equal to the inverse of the productivity index.
P't
Note that the ratio used in the text is preferable to the alternative because,in
the absence of economic impact,=F0;such a ratio would then be greater than
zero regardless of the lack of change.
108will be remembered that the capacity utilization adjustment obtained by hold-
ing the capital-output ratio constant at its 1910 level exaggerated the explanatory
value of this factor. Hence the .75 ratio credits too much to technology in a relative
sense, because the denominator is too small.THE RAILROAD SECTOR, 1840—1910 645
Inpart, this doubt will be resolved by extending the analysis to factors
not taken up here, such as the increased educational level of railway
employees and the value of an experienced labor force. In part, too, it
must be resolved by a finer analysis of technical progress than has been
performed here. The underlying engineering relationships employed, such
as that relating the wear of rails to tonnage passing over them, can be
made more sophisticated and exact. Testing these against actual experience
is also necessary. Likewise, the cost relationships taken on the authority
of Wellington can find more accurate substitutes in statistical cost functions
fitted to the data. A third direction of advance is the use of smaller time
intervals than the forty-year period employed here. The relative importance
of innovations within shorter spans may be quite different.It is possible
that between 1870 and 1890 the substitution of steel rails made up much
more of the productivity gain than over the longer haul since it was
concentrated in those earlier years.
Despite these admitted deficiencies of the present calculations, they do
point to certain conclusions that seem likely to hold up under closer
scrutiny. One of these is the limited economic significance of air brakes
and automatic couplers in the array of late nineteenth century improve-
ments. Another is the important role of the larger engines, a trend that
is not attributable to a sudden major breakthrough, but rather to a
cumulation of knowledge of design. The apparent sudden increase in the
ratio of load to dead weight in freight cars in the late 1870's is more of a
discontinuity. Yet virtually nothing has been done to determine the origins
and causes of this major shift.Finally, these quantitative results confirm
one major contention on which historians have been nearly unanimous:
the importance of steel rails. Yet even in this instance, an amendment
is necessary. What made such rails so crucial was less their wearing
properties than their strength, and the opportunity thus presented for
heavier trains.
Concluding Comments
Economists have come more and more to appreciate the role increased
efficiency plays in the present growth of income per capita. The American
economy in the nineteenth century was probably no exception. Economic
historians must evaluate and interpret that experience from the same
vantage point. In this paper we have made a tentative start in this direction
in the railway sector. Two objectives have been pursued: first, extension
and correction of the underlying data to provide a reasonably firm long-
term record of inputs and outputs in the industry; second, explanation
of the notable productivity growth that emerges. The latter endeavor646 SOURCES OF PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
also illustrated the wider possibilities of placing the analysis of specific
innovations within an aggregate context, as well as yielding important
substantive results.
Obviously, there is much left to do. Within the railway sector, the
tasks range from more detailed evaluation of the factors influencing
productivity advance to application of such information to such important
historical questions as regional rate differences, discrimination between
short and long hauls, and excessively high railway profits.All of the
latter topics need to be restudied with more reliance upon underlying and
changing conditions of production of railway services. Railroads, however
important, are only one activity among many. Other industry studies
must be carried out too.These conference proceedings include three
such ventures into the extractive industries, albeit with rather limited
attention to productivity per Se.For manufacturing, there is nothing,
however. Recalcitrance of the data helps to explain this, although one
suspects that this is an area of research where important gains can be and
are yet to be made.